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Summary 
This paper analyses the policies and priorities of the governments of Cambodia and Malawi 
with respect to capacity development support (CDS), based on secondary research evidence 
and perceptions of effectiveness from a wide range of stakeholders. The study concentrates on 
the two governments’ overall objectives and strategies on CDS and contrasts these to the 
situation in the health and education sectors, as two sectors that generate a strong need for 
capacity development and attract a significant portion of development cooperation. While 
CDS is provided in many forms, this study has restricted its analysis to dedicated events and 
advisory services. 
A first observation of this study is that as longstanding aid-dependent countries, Cambodia 
and Malawi provide a ‘disabling environment’ that hinders the effective management and use 
of external support for capacity development. Both countries are characterised by a highly 
politicised civil service that is part and parcel of a neo-patrimonial governance system, where 
civil servants themselves are paid at a level on which they cannot sustain their livelihoods, 
and where responsibility for service delivery has been partially ‘outsourced’ to external 
partners. It is easier for donors to take up such a role than to withdraw from it, and some 
donor officials lamented the need for them to be continuously ‘bailing out’ government. 
Under these conditions, even when unconvinced of their change potential, government would 
tend still to accept CDS interventions for the project-benefits these come with, which help 
civil servants make ends meet. Without detracting from the strong advances in the capacity of 
both governments, this study repeats earlier studies in observing that the governments have 
developed capacity, yet at a level that is nowhere near commensurate to the high CDS 
investments made.  
At the time the study was conducted, donors mostly provided CDS bilaterally, with limited 
exchange and joint action with other CDS providers. This represents a step backwards from a 
decade ago, when trust and energy was invested by government and donors alike in 
coordinated approaches under developing-country leadership. The period when Sector-Wide 
Approaches (SWAps) were implemented with strong donor participation temporarily 
increased line-ministry leverage over CDS and led to a more coordinated process of joint 
identification of needs. Though sometimes perceived as such, SWAps do not particularly 
prescribe forms of joint financing (e.g. budget support) but instead promote transparent and 
concerted forms of government-led development cooperation. The key difference from a 
decade ago is that donors’ headquarters have lost both the appetite and political support to 
engage in coordinated approaches with less control and reduced visibility. 
More than a decade ago, both Cambodia and Malawi formally expressed the need for change 
and, with donor financial support, commissioned studies that presented a critical assessment 
of the state of play. These studies subsequently informed their overall development 
cooperation strategies that call for a need to reform current CDS practices. These were backed 
up by international declarations on aid effectiveness that called for similar reforms. Given this 
apparent clear sense of direction, the question is why these overall priorities have failed to 
become translated into practice? 
An important part of the answer is that formal objectives for reform of CDS, as expressed in 
overall development cooperation policies, are a key starting point for government’s reform 
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efforts though nothing more than that. Evidence gathered in the two countries suggests that, 
despite the clear and fundamental objectives for reform of CDS, actual efforts made by 
government to operationalise and implement these have been modest and mainly limited to 
‘sensitisation’ of donors. Moreover, and exceptions notwithstanding, the government officials 
who gave shape to these overall aid policies are not the same as the officials who work directly 
with donors in elaborating concrete interventions. Line ministries on the receiving end of 
development cooperation are less directly led by government’s aid management policies, which 
are mostly championed by their ministries of finance or dedicated planning agencies. 
Actions committed to on the part of government in the area of CDS reform, which in both 
cases concerned the adoption of a national strategy on capacity development in relation to 
public-sector reform, have failed to take off or remained on the drawing board. The somewhat 
paradoxical result is two governments strongly intent on fundamentally changing CDS 
practices, in the case of Cambodia with specific guidelines on TC, but without an overall 
strategy on how to make use of such reoriented support in terms of relating it to their own 
capacity development objectives and efforts. 
Sectoral capacity development strategies were prepared by the line ministries responsible for 
health and education but, apart from the Cambodian education Master Plan, were not adopted. 
Relatively top-down approaches to leadership and patronage networks strongly influencing 
internal mobility in government have hindered CDS initiatives in promoting capacity results 
that transcend the individual level or the actions of individual departments. The dire situation 
in the public service causes the health and education ministries to pursue resource 
maximisation strategies that largely involve accommodating donors’ projects in different 
shapes and forms. No specific push is made for CDS to use and support government’s own 
systems, while negotiations of individual interventions mainly focus on detailing specific 
project components (as opposed to discussing whether the project is needed) and whom these 
should target. This indicates that officials in government are still inclined to accept support 
that is provided in ways that do not fully align with their systems.  
In the absence of ministry-owned CD plans, and a clear and ambiguous management push, 
most donors resort to taking a strong lead in designing CDS interventions. Whilst 
understandable as a pragmatic approach to dispatching experts and using allocated funds, this 
approach risks providing CDS to areas that government considers low priority, or to which it 
refuses to give due priority because it lacks the will for change. The latter areas included 
strong donor priorities such as merit-based pay, decentralised procurement and national audit 
functions. 
In terms of focus, CDS interventions thus concentrated mostly on the functional dimensions 
of governance in the sector and mainly pursued technical solutions to observed problems, 
lacks and deficits. Both government and donor officials suggested that the other side was 
mainly interested in such ‘technical fixes’, but this is again explained by the more systemic 
difficulties and barriers towards support targeting more political dimensions of capacity. In a 
formal sense, these could be considered ‘off-limits’ for external support, yet many cases were 
detected where advisors were made an integral and essential part of government’s own 
change-management efforts.  
Interdisciplinary research on effective cooperation highlights the importance of fairness, 
trustworthiness, communication and reputation, all of which linked to the central aspect of 
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reciprocity. Beyond the challenge of giving adequate attention to these factors in the design of 
interventions, the processes of procuring or recruiting local or international advisors focus 
insufficiently on ensuring and promoting these key factors, and instead emphasise ‘objective’ 
selection criteria such as technical skills, years of experience and academic qualifications. 
Low donor investments into evaluations of CDS interventions, as well as their tendency to keep 
such reports internal, hinder learning from past experiences and affect institutional memory. 
This risks duplicating or replicating interventions with low value or counterproductive effects 
that could otherwise have been adjusted or changed to ensure greater relevance and 
effectiveness. More fundamentally, it reflects a lack of transparency in the objectives and 
features of individual CDS interventions, which has an unintended effect of contributing to 
negative perceptions and prejudices among government officials about CDS and advisors in 
particular. 
These findings thus describe a political economy whereby all involved actors have few 
incentives to radically change the way in which CDS is managed and where, instead, 
ineffective practices are largely reproduced over time as none of the actors experience any 
direct costs or consequences for doing so, as well as no direct rewards for change. While 
some donors have introduced important reforms, government remains best-placed to 
fundamentally break through this cycle of low effectiveness. As per these overall findings, 
this study concludes that it is not formal strategies and policy frameworks but individual 
perceptions and attitudes of government officials that decisively influence the role and ability 
of CDS to support government and develop capacity. In aid-dependent and low-income 
countries such as Cambodia and Malawi, longer-term CDS interventions are more likely to be 
effective and sustainable when they promote adaptive and teamwork-oriented approaches 
under the leadership of strong and respected government officials. 
Guided by this overall conclusion, six changes to existing practices need to be made to 
promote more effective and sustainable CDS in Cambodia and Malawi: 
1. The starting point of preparing CDS interventions should be a joint diagnosis of the sector, 
in which government and all donors equally participate, as opposed to bilateral appraisal 
missions. 
2. The design of interventions needs to be driven and led by key change-makers in 
government. Donors should adapt their procurement or recruitment procedures to refrain 
from providing support unless government leads this process. 
3. Advisors with a capacity-development mandate should only report to government and not 
to donors, and ToRs should avoid fragmented or donor-oriented accountability relations. 
4. Co-funding of advisors by government should be required as a proxy of real commitment. 
Requiring government to contribute formally to each advisor, even if at a minor level, 
would improve conditions for reciprocity and strengthen accountability relations. 
5. Donors should report disaggregated budgets of CDS interventions through government’s 
own systems, and make public ToRs and evaluations of CDS interventions. Current 
practices lack transparency and encourage duplication, fragmentation and suspicion. 
6. Government should commission periodic evaluations to assess progress made in 
strengthening sector capacity, including the effectiveness of external inputs provided. Such 
evaluations would promote integrated capacity development approaches in government. 
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These recommendations provide a basis for a gradual and incremental shift towards more 
formalised and centrally planned CDS management, which government could manage 
through its own systems for public planning, procurement, implementation and reporting. If it 
is still strongly reliant on external inputs at this stage of a more centralised demand 
articulation, such efforts could be guided by a government-wide capacity-development 
strategy that includes, but does not revolve around, objectives and principles for external 
support. The drafting and implementation of such a strategy should be led by the government 
ministry responsible for the public service. 
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1 Introduction 
In an increasingly interconnected world, the need to reinvent the wheel is long gone. 
Countries do not develop themselves through autarky and self-reliance, but through 
“importing what the rest of the world knows and exporting what it wants” (UNDP 2013, 
4, 5). To effectively learn and benefit from the knowledge and know-how of other 
countries and regions, and respond to the opportunities created by their demands, 
countries have to make efforts that are commonly referred to as ‘capacity development’. 
Since productive capabilities cannot simply be transferred, doing so requires time and 
significant investment (Whitfield 2012). This process is inevitably self-motivated and self-
driven, with an important role for the state in facilitating societal transformation, but also 
offers strong potential for international cooperation. 
Global discussions on reforming international cooperation led to the adoption of the Busan 
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation in 2011, which identifies four key 
ingredients of effective cooperation. The first and most essential of these ingredients is 
that “Partnerships for development can only succeed if they are led by developing 
countries, implementing approaches that are tailored to country-specific situations and 
needs.” The implementation of these principles was assessed at a high-level meeting in 
Mexico in April 2014, where delegates reaffirmed their commitment to align and tailor 
cooperation to the national agenda and context of developing countries (BP 2011; MC 
2014). These meetings were certainly not the first international occasions where the 
concept of ‘ownership’ was recognised as essential for effective cooperation.1 Given 
observed challenges to promoting such ownership in practice, the Busan Partnership calls 
for the strengthening of developing countries’ institutions and policies, which it recognises 
as “essential for sustainable development” (BP 2011; MC 2014). 
When it comes to specifying how international support can help promote effective 
institutions, the Busan outcome document builds on earlier commitments made in Paris and 
Accra that define capacity development as the responsibility of developing countries, with 
their external partners in a supporting role. The outcome document confirms that the “use 
and strengthening of country systems remains central to our efforts to build effective 
institutions”, with the term ‘country systems’ referring to developing countries’ own 
arrangements and procedures for public-sector planning, budgeting and accountability. The 
commitments made not only prioritise giving targeted support to countries intent on 
strengthening their systems, but also emphasise that the full range of external support needs 
increasingly to be managed through developing countries’ own systems for planning, 
management and review. This implies a shift away from the practice of delivering 
development cooperation though discrete and donor-controlled projects that, to a large 
extent, are implemented parallel to these country systems. The Mexico Communiqué 
reaffirms the Busan commitment to strengthen and use country systems as the default 
approach, with the priority of strengthening dialogue on the extent to which their use is 
appropriate (BP 2011; MC 2014). 
The substantial attention to this topic in international policy discussions contrasts with a 
relative absence of research evidence on the use of country systems, which is mainly 
                                                          
1  These include the 2002 Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action.  
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macro-oriented and primarily focuses on the link between composite indices measuring 
the quality of country systems, and the use of these systems by donors2 (see for instance 
Knack 2012; 2013). There is a research gap in the extent to which, and how, interventions 
in specific areas and sectors concretely make use of country systems, such as in the 
planning and preparation of support, in the contracting or procurement of external 
expertise, or in the area of monitoring and evaluation. Although the Paris Declaration 
singled out Capacity Development Support (CDS) as key to helping strengthen these 
systems, only limited evidence is available on the extent to which, and how, CDS 
interventions themselves are managed through these systems (Keijzer 2013).  
This lack of evidence of how the governments of developing countries seek to manage 
CDS from their donors motivated the preparation and conducting of a study on this topic. 
Cambodia and Malawi were identified as relevant countries to cover, given their strong 
role in international discussions on aid and development effectiveness. This is reflected in 
their participation in and coverage by the two independent joint evaluations of the Paris 
Declaration in 2008 and 2011, as well as their membership of the Effective Institutions 
Platform (EIP) as the main international dialogue platform for policy discussion on 
capacity development support.3 A second reason to select these two countries is that they 
have had access to a large volume of CDS over an extensive period, and have made 
dedicated efforts to adopt overall development cooperation management policies that 
could be contrasted with the management of CDS in practice.  
The study’s central hypothesis is that further improvements to CDS, as well as their 
positive contributions to effective public policies and institutions, are primarily driven by 
developing countries’ own efforts to make this happen. The main focus of the study was to 
assess to what extent the governments in the two countries differ in their approaches to 
managing CDS, and to what extent the CDS provided corresponds to these preferences 
and priorities. As per this overall hypothesis and focus, this study did not depart from the 
international commitments, but instead used an inductive approach that takes the actual 
interests and motivations of both governments and their external partners as a starting 
point. This approach was felt to be appropriate and effective for identifying achievements 
and challenges in the areas of CDS that are specific and unique to each country, as well as 
those achievements and challenges that both countries share and which may also apply to 
other comparable countries. The study’s findings, conclusions and recommendations seek 
to inform the actions of government and donor officials, as well as practitioners active in 
these two countries, but may also be of relevance to similar efforts in other aid-dependent, 
low-income countries. 
In studying the two countries, a choice was made to focus on the health and education 
sectors, not with the ambition of a complete coverage of these sectors but as a means to 
analyse how overall development cooperation management policies are operationalised 
and implemented in specific sectors. Health was chosen as a sector that had previously 
been covered by the Paris Declaration evaluation in 2011, as well as for being a relatively 
‘over-crowded’ sector, which can lead to donor-coordination challenges. Education was 
chosen as it typically involves a large proportion of the civil service and, as with health, 
                                                          
2  Although recent policy discussions have advanced terms including ‘development partners’ and 
‘providers of development cooperation’, this paper uses the term ‘donor’ for pragmatic reasons.  
3  For details please refer to http://www.effectiveinstitutions.org/ (accessed 15 Apr 2014) 
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represents strong capacity development challenges for government. In addition, given that 
a broad range of interventions is associated with CDS, it was decided to restrict the 
study’s analysis to those interventions that were most commonly associated with capacity 
development in both countries, namely dedicated events and, in particular, the provision of 
short- and long-term advisory services. The latter group was frequently referred to by 
respondents as Technical Assistance (TA). 
The analysis presented in this study is based on a detailed literature review and semi-
structured interviews. These interviews were conducted during short visits to each country 
during March 2014, with six working days spent in each country. Within this period, 
interviews were conducted with a total of 58 people belonging to different actor groups, as 
specified in Table 1. Written notes were taken during the interviews, which were 
conducted on the condition that no-one would be quoted and that findings would not be 
related to organisations or individuals.  
Table 1: Interviewees 
 Government 
officials 
Donors and 
implementing 
agencies 
Regional and 
international 
advisors 
Independent 
consultants 
Cambodia 
(n = 27) 3 15 4 2 
Malawi 
(n = 31) 9 13 7 2 
Six overarching research questions were formulated to test the study’s central hypothesis 
that the engagement of a developing-country government matters for the effectiveness of 
CDS:  
1. How can the developing-country government’s approaches to managing external 
cooperation be described, in terms of its formal policies and/or concrete actions 
towards promoting aid and development effectiveness in general? 
2. At what level and how does the government articulate or otherwise promote specific 
priorities for capacity development, and how does it engage with relevant 
stakeholders in determining these? 
3. To what extent does the government have an overview of total CDS provided to the 
country by different providers? 
4. To what extent are the government’s own systems used in planning, designing, 
contracting or procuring, implementing and evaluating the CDS provided by different 
stakeholders?  
5. Linked to this overview of support, how can CDS accountability relations be 
described in terms of (a) the sharing of information on CDS interventions between 
stakeholders, (b) dedicated processes to learn from past CDS interventions by those 
directly involved and (c) sharing lessons learned from past support with other relevant 
stakeholders? 
6. What lessons can be drawn from the findings in terms of the relation between 
developing-country efforts to strengthen institutions and joint efforts to strengthen 
the effectiveness of CDS? What possible implications can be identified for further 
international discussion and engagement? 
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These six research questions were operationalised into 17 sub-questions to guide the 
collection of information needed to answer the main research questions (see annex 1). 
A few limitations of this study should be acknowledged and kept in mind by the reader 
when considering its findings, conclusions and recommendations. First and foremost, the 
limited available resources and time, as well as the absence of an overview on the total 
amount of CDS provided (see 2.3) means that this study cannot provide a complete and 
fully representative assessment of CDS effectiveness in the two countries. Instead, the 
study provides a well-informed and evidence-based ‘snapshot’ of CDS effectiveness in 
specific sectors, based on available research evidence as well as the information and 
perceptions shared by the interviewees, which can inform further discussion and decision-
making to evaluate and/or improve the effectiveness of CDS. Secondly, in Cambodia a 
recent change in leadership at the level of the Health Technical Working Group on the 
side of government meant that no suitable interviewee in the Ministry of Health could be 
identified during the time of the visit. Third and last, both countries found themselves in 
relatively turbulent periods at the time when the study was conducted, including the post-
election protests and societal unrest in Cambodia, and the Malawian ‘Cashgate’ scandal4 
that emerged ahead of the country’s general elections in May 2014 and involved ministers 
and senior civil servants misusing a government computer system to steal millions of 
euros.5 Cashgate led to the suspension of all budget support and a media-heavy debate 
around a forensic audit on the matter ahead of the elections in May 2014, which meant 
that the Malawian government was cash-strapped and that formal relationships between 
donors and government were at a low point. While the present situation had to be taken 
into account, most of the interviews took a more retrospective and medium-term look into 
government policies and past and present CDS.  
The paper is structured in six sections. Following this introduction, Section 2 defines key 
concepts used in this study and reviews existing evaluation evidence on the effectiveness 
of CDS for contrasting with this study’s findings. Section 3 presents and discusses the 
development paths of Cambodia and Malawi and looks into what differences and 
similarities these show. Section 4 continues with describing both countries’ overall 
development cooperation management policies as well as the specific policies in the area 
of health and education. Section 5 contrasts these policies to the actual practices of 
planning, managing and evaluating CDS. Section 6 closes this paper by discussing the 
findings presented, and presenting overall conclusions and recommendations.  
 
 
 
                                                          
4  A brief analysis of the scandal and its implications is provided by the Guardian here: 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jan/14/malawi-aid-freeze-health-education 
(accessed 6 Jun 2014). 
5  Although published after the elections, given that the interviews were conducted in March 2014 a 
choice has been made not to update this paper based on the results of the elections.  
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2 Literature review and working definitions: CDS and country systems 
2.1 Capacity development 
Since development cooperation formally started in the middle of the 20th century, 
international policy discussions acknowledge that development requires more than 
‘hardware’ and financial input, and that there is an equal if not greater need for investment 
in the less visible, more ‘human’ aspects of development. From the late 1980s onwards, 
the concepts of capacity building and capacity development have been the dominant terms 
used to capture this aspect of development cooperation, and have gradually replaced other 
concepts such as institution building and human resource development, each reflecting 
elements of the dominant development narrative at the time (Kühl 2009). 
The term ‘capacity development’ features centrally in development policy discussions, 
with the following definitions reflecting the international policy consensus (OECD, 2006): 
x Capacity is the ability of people, organisations and society as a whole to manage their 
affairs successfully. 
x Capacity development6 is the process whereby people, organisations and society as a 
whole unlock, strengthen, create, adapt and maintain capacity over time. 
x Capacity development support refers to what outside partners can do to support, 
facilitate or catalyse capacity development and related change processes. 
These general definitions describe what capacity means, what its development entails and 
what role is played by external support, albeit in very general terms. As such, the 
international consensus leaves many questions unanswered and fails to provide real 
operational guidance, such as which aspects of capacity matter most, and how concretely 
international actors can support endogenous processes without disrupting these. Different 
donors have made efforts to further operationalise the concept by distinguishing different 
dimensions or sub-sets that together form capacity.7 Drawing on these and other insights, 
Boesen (2010, 149) proposes four dimensions shaping capacity that can be useful to 
analyse capacity development processes at the level of organisations, which remains the 
key focus of most CDS interventions (Table 2).  
Studies call on all actors involved in providing CDS to stop managing it as if it is 
something technical, to develop an operationally relevant understanding of the context in 
which they work, and, based on that, to influence what is within reach as well as adapt to 
that which is not. Capacity development comes with ups and downs, creates winners and 
losers, and is therefore not a neutral and apolitical activity (Boesen 2010; Baser / Morgan 
2008; Ortiz 2013). The bottom line is that the wider environment, consisting of structural 
and institutional factors as well as all key actors involved, enables or disables capacity 
development and strongly determines to what extent external inputs, when managed in the 
right way, can make a difference (Boesen 2011). 
                                                          
6  Initially the term ‘capacity building’ was used, but was soon accompanied by ‘capacity development’ 
which some consider emphasises the endogenous nature of capacity and its development. The two 
terms are, however, considered similar if not identical, and both are still in use today. 
7  Please refer to Baser (2011) for a detailed overview and analysis of such approaches.  
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Table 2: Four dimensions that influence capacity change 
 Functional: technical and economic 
efficiency, and professional quality 
Political: the energy that brings motion, 
direction and change 
Internal:  
supply-side change 
Internal/functional: strategy, systems, 
structures, work processes, internal 
relationships 
Internal/political: leadership, power 
distribution, material and non-material 
incentives, rewards and sanctions, 
possible vested interests, conflicts 
External:  
demand-driven 
change 
External/functional: legal framework, 
timeliness and adequacy of resources, 
performance targets, oversight bodies, 
formal accountability requirements 
External/political: political governance, 
vested interests, pressure from clients, 
customers, competitors, media attention 
Source: adapted from Boesen, 2010, 1498 
A consequence of a dynamic and relational understanding of capacity is that it is not 
possible to ‘plug’ capacity deficits through outside support, meaning that over-reductionist 
and technocratic approaches will be ineffective or even counterproductive. Instead, 
capacity development is a process involving many stakeholders, and external support has 
to be part and parcel of ongoing change processes. Based on a review of literature from 
the social and natural sciences, Messner, Guarín and Haun (2013) identify reciprocity as a 
fundamental principle for cooperation that is influenced by four key enablers (see Figure 
1). In addition to these, enforcement is a key mechanism to rein in uncooperative partners, 
while the literature also shows that the four enablers of reciprocity are more likely to 
emerge within groups that share similarities or a common narrative (Ibid.).  
Figure 1: Four enablers of reciprocity as the prerequisite for cooperation 
 
Source: own elaboration based on Messner / Guarín / Haun 2013, 15–229 
                                                          
8  Minor modifications made to the original by adding definitions for the internal/external and functional / 
political distinctions.  
Reciprocity: 
cooperation driven by 
the expectation of 
returned favours
Communication: 
direct exchange on 
cooperation 
increases trust
Trust: belief about 
the probability of 
reciprocation
Fair: 
fairness as 
self-centered 
inequity aversion
Reputation: 
cooperation driven 
by perceptions of 
trustworthiness
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Development-cooperation actors may hold these truths to be self-evident, but in many 
cases only at a theoretical level. In practice, they instead shape a political economy that 
does not systematically promote these cooperation enablers, mostly due to the 
asymmetrical relation inherent to development cooperation. which limits possibilities for 
both reciprocity and enforcement. The nature of the relationship represents a discrepancy 
in the ways developing-country stakeholders and their external partners formally subscribe 
to these definitions in overall policies as well as international declarations, and what they 
in practice do under the label of ‘capacity development’. This discrepancy reflects an 
uneasy match between the ‘interventionist’ nature of development cooperation and the 
understanding of capacity development as an endogenous change process (Keijzer 2013). 
Instead of supporting developing-country stakeholders’ capacity development, much of 
what is done instead seeks to create the conditions for effective implementation of external 
interventions (De Lange 2013; Matheson 2011).  
2.2 Country systems 
A second key concept guiding this study concerns the management of development 
cooperation through so-called ‘country systems’. This concept is reflected in international 
development policy discussions and is one key element of the commitment made by 
donors to respect and follow developing-country leadership. At the fourth High-Level 
Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in December 2011, international partners committed 
to promoting effective institutions by using country systems as the ‘default approach’ for 
cooperation in support of the public sector in developing countries. The 2014 high-level 
meeting in Mexico reaffirmed the commitment and called for further action in assessment 
and policy dialogue (BP 2011; MC 2014). 
The discussions in Busan built on earlier international meetings on aid effectiveness, with 
the basis for the commitment to using country systems defined in the 2005 Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The Paris Declaration presents two key assumptions 
about the use of country systems: (1) when development cooperation is managed through 
country systems this helps to strengthen these systems; (2) external support can help to 
strengthen the capacity of these systems. The OECD summarises these studies as 
confirming that the Paris Declaration’s assumptions are grounded in evidence, but finds 
that donors are not yet systematically making greater use of them, despite advances made 
by developing countries in strengthening these (OECD 2013, 147).  
Despite giving it strong priority, the Paris Declaration was ambiguous as to what is meant 
by ‘country systems’, as no clear-cut definition is presented; instead, a list of non-
exhaustive examples is provided. The Declaration’s monitoring framework moreover 
promoted a restrictive understanding by including Public Finance Management (PFM) 
indicators to measure the strength of country systems. This has promoted a perception that 
the use of country systems was mainly a matter of financial management of development 
cooperation, particularly linked to the use of certain aid modalities that were deemed most 
suitable for using PFM systems.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
9  Messner / Guarín / Haun (2013) discuss several definitions for each of these concepts from different 
disciplines, based on which the figure includes key elements deemed helpful for this paper. 
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In the period 2005–2011 various studies were commissioned to look into the operational 
implications of the commitment made to using country systems (see, for instance, CABRI 
2009). Based on these studies, the following three dimensions of using country systems 
can be distinguished (Table 3): 
Table 3: Three dimensions of using country systems (UCS) in development cooperation 
Dimension 1: Aligning to 
country planning and 
budgeting processes 
Dimension 2: Using country 
Public Finance Management 
systems 
Dimension 3: Using country 
financial oversight and 
evaluation systems 
1.1: Development cooperation is 
integrated in government’s plans 
and budget requests  
2.1: Development cooperation is 
disbursed into the main treasury 
account and managed through 
government systems 
3.1: Development cooperation is 
recorded and accounted for in 
government accounting systems  
1.2: Development cooperation is 
included in the government 
budget documentation 
2.2: Procurement of cooperation 
inputs follows government 
standards and procedures 
3.2: Development cooperation is 
audited by the supreme audit 
institution 
1.3: Development cooperation is 
included in budget appropriations 
approved by the parliament 
3.3: Development cooperation is 
included in government’s ex-post 
reports 
Source: own elaboration, based on Sprietzer and Vargas, 2011, 47 
While there is value in further policy discussion and agreement on the definition and 
operationalisation of the commitments to using country systems, it should be emphasised 
that doing so is not an end in itself but one of the possible means to enable more effective 
cooperation in specific contexts. Not only donors but also developing-country governments 
may differ in the importance they attach to promoting the use of their systems, which among 
other factors depends on absolute and relative amounts of ODA received. Recent research 
shows how developing-country governments particularly value and promote ownership, 
alignment and speed in external support, meaning that they themselves may not strongly 
promote all aspects of country systems (Greenhill et al 2013).  
There will also be different views and positions on the use of country systems between 
different stakeholders within the same country, since increasing the use of country systems 
affects power relations inside government and between stakeholders. All involved have to 
reconcile the different interests they pursue, of which effectively implementing national 
development strategies and promoting capacity development is but one. In this light, while 
the use of country systems is an important element of the study, it should be analysed as 
one possible priority of a developing-country government’s approach to managing CDS 
within the context of its wider development cooperation management strategy.  
2.3 Donor approaches to supporting capacity development 
It is not straightforward to distinguish between those external interventions that seek to 
promote capacity development and those that do not. Instead, it is more realistic to assume 
that each individual development intervention has to find a balance between ‘doing things 
for partners’ and ‘helping the partners do their own things’ (Morton 2013). There is thus no 
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such thing as a capacity-neutral intervention, as any external intervention will inevitably 
have an impact on the capacity of the partners taking part in or otherwise affected by it.  
Although it is not possible to differentiate between interventions that affect capacity and 
those that do not, international statistics on development cooperation do distinguish a 
group of interventions that pursues CD as its main objective. As per this distinction, the 
bulk of CDS assistance is delivered in the form of Technical Cooperation (TC), which the 
OECD defines as “provision of know-how in the form of personnel, training, research and 
associated costs whose primary purpose is to augment the level of knowledge, skills, 
technical know-how or productive aptitudes of the population” (OECD, 2010, 15). 
TC is provided in many different ways, including by specialised development agencies, 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the private sector, either through direct 
contracting or competitive tendering. Studies have noted that this definition of TC is often 
confounded with Technical Assistance (TA) and suggest defining TC as actions aimed at 
strengthening individual and organisational capacity, and TA as the personnel involved in 
the implementation and management of TC services (Hauck / Bana 2009).  
As recognised by the OECD, and contrary to its own definition, it should be emphasised 
that TC is often provided for other objectives than supporting capacity development, such 
as project appraisal, monitoring and evaluation of development interventions, and 
financial oversight (Matheson 2011; OECD 2006, 23). In 2009, the European Commission 
adopted guidelines that distinguish the following four possible objectives of TC (Hauck / 
Bana 2009, 10):  
x Help develop the capacity of organisations and individuals – often long-term; 
x Provide policy and/or expert advice – often short-term; 
x Reinforce (or substitute for weak) implementation capacity; 
x Prepare/ facilitate bi- or multi-lateral cooperation. 
Such a distinction is, however, not applied in the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System 
(CRS). It is moreover not possible to get a view of the total amount spent on TC because 
some TC is embedded in larger projects and only reported separately by OECD members 
on an optional basis. In addition, the cost of supplying consultants is not separated from 
the overhead costs involved. While recognising these limitations, it is estimated that TC 
comprised approximately one-sixth of ODA (excluding debt relief) in the period 2007–
2011 (Tew 2013, 2, 3).  
In view of the lack of transparency of available statistics, and given the study’s inductive 
focus on developing-country governments’ policies and priorities, a choice was made to 
focus on those types of support that developing-country governments most directly 
associated with capacity development support, namely workshops as well as short- and 
long-term advisory services that are commonly referred to by government officials as 
Technical Assistance (TAs).  
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2.4 International consensus on effective capacity development support 
Long-standing concern over the effectiveness of CDS among policy makers has resulted 
in a significant volume of independent studies and evaluations that have investigated the 
scope and potential for improving this area of support (see Keijzer 2013). Although CDS 
is often portrayed as supply-led and donor-driven, available studies do not blame this 
solely on donors but argue that improving CDS requires collective and concerted action by 
those who provide, and stand to benefit from, this area of support. Wood et al (2011, xiv) 
formulate this as follows:  
“The complex, long-term challenges of capacity development are the most important 
constraints for most countries, and these do not allow for ‘quick fixes’ or 
bureaucratically engineered solutions. However, partner countries can do more to 
identify priorities for strengthening capacities in targeted areas. Donors and agencies 
in turn can do more to support those priorities in coordinated ways, to strengthen 
country systems by using them and to reduce donor practices that undermine the 
development of sustainable capacity.” 
These and other studies have identified concrete ways to improve cooperation practices in 
the management of CDS, which covers the entire project cycle from planning to 
evaluation. A common thread in these recommendations is increasing the ownership of, 
and control by, developing-country stakeholders over CDS. Table 4 summarises the main 
recommendations from these studies in relation to the different stages of the project cycle, 
which in turn are related to the dimensions of commitments to using country systems 
introduced above. This provides a ‘yardstick’ of good-practice principles that can be 
contrasted to the concrete practices that are explored in this study. The concluding section 
of this paper contrasts these good-practice principles with the actual practice described by 
interviewees and in relevant studies. 
3 Cambodia and Malawi: differences and similarities in development paths 
This section introduces Cambodia and Malawi by presenting key aspects of their 
development trajectories during the past decades, an overview of efforts to increase ODA 
transparency and CDS received, and a summary of available political economy analysis.  
3.1 General characteristics and trends 
Cambodia became independent in 1953. After nearly two decades of relative stability, a 
1970 coup d’état introduced a military junta and an era of turmoil, characterised by armed 
conflict and genocide. The junta was removed by the communist regime of the Khmer 
Rouge in 1975, which remained in power until the Cambodian–Vietnamese War started in 
1979 and triggered a decade of low-intensity conflict, international isolation and economic 
downturn. At the start of this period Prime Minister Hun Sen and his Cambodian People’s 
Party (CPP) entered the stage as part of a Vietnamese-backed regime and began to dominate 
Cambodian politics. During the 1990s peace process Cambodia re-entered the international 
community, negotiated the Paris Peace Accords in 1991 and thereby gave way to  
the government of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) from 
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Table 4: Good-practice principles for effective capacity development support 
 Planning Identification 
and design 
Budgeting Procure-
ment and 
recruitment 
Implemen-
tation 
Monitoring 
and 
evaluation 
 UCS dimension 1: Planning and budgeting UCS 2: PFM UCS 3: Oversight 
and evaluation 
Partner Articulate 
CD 
objectives 
linked to 
ongoing 
change 
processes 
Jointly identify 
CDS 
objectives and 
operationalise 
interventions 
 
Jointly discuss 
CDS options; 
donors to be 
transparent on 
financial 
details of CDS 
options 
Include CDS 
spending in 
government’s 
budget 
 Ensure 
adequate 
supervision 
and 
management 
of CDS 
Reflect CDS 
in 
accounting 
systems and 
ex-post 
reports 
Identify CDS 
needs in 
bottom-up 
manner 
Invest and 
manage aid-
management 
systems 
 Request and 
process 
reporting on 
CDS 
Seek 
involvement 
in 
evaluations 
Donor Follow 
partner lead 
in identifying 
and 
articulating 
demand 
Provide 
timely 
information 
on CDS 
funding to 
government 
Ensure that 
developing 
countries 
lead 
recruitment 
decisions 
Clarify 
managerial 
responsi-
bility; ensure 
that CDS is 
primarily 
accountable 
to 
beneficiary 
Ensure full 
partner 
involvement 
in M&E  
Avoid 
making other 
interventions 
conditional 
on CDS 
Phase out 
formal and 
informal 
tying 
Adapt 
reporting 
formats and 
language to 
partner 
Sources: Wood et al 2011; Land 2007; Land / Morgan 2008; OPM 2003; IEO 2005 
1992–1993. However, insurgency and political instability continued until 1998. In a 1997 
coup d’état against senior coalition partner FUNCINPEC10, Hun Sen ousted the royalist 
Prime Minister. The CPP emerged from the restrictive 1998 General Election as the new 
senior partner in the CPP-FUNCINPEC coalition, which survived the disputed 2003 
elections and lasted until 2008, when the CPP formed a one-party government. In July 
2013, Hun Sen and the CPP officially won the elections, which triggered protests by 
supporters of the newly united opponent, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), 
which contests and boycotts parliament. 
Malawian post-independence history can be divided into three periods: 1) pre-independence 
British rule until 1964; 2) post-independence dictatorial rule by President Hastings Kamuzu 
Banda based on the single-party dominance of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and its 
paramilitary until 1994; and 3) contemporary multi-party democracy (Jimat 2010, 8). Since 
1994, four general elections have been held. The first two in 1994 and 1998 were won by 
President Bakili Muluzi, and the subsequent two elections in 2004 and 2009 by President 
                                                          
10  FUNCINPEC stands for Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique, et 
Coopératif. 
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Bingu wa Mutharika. While economic and aid relations improved under the first term of 
Mutharika, they deteriorated during his second term. The recent period from 2000–2004 was 
characterised by concerns among donors over deteriorating governance and increasing 
corruption, which led to the suspension of several initiatives and aid disbursements 
(Fölscher et al. 2012b). In April 2012, Mutharika passed away and was succeeded by Vice 
President Joyce Banda who, in June 2014, was succeeded by Peter Mutharika. While Banda 
initially succeeded in improving relations with donors and resuming budget-support 
disbursements, the 2013 Cashgate corruption scandal hit the international media and led to 
the suspension of USD 150 million of budget support. The strong reliance on ODA means 
that such actions will directly affect economic growth, which strongly depends on the cash 
crops that represent 90% of the country’s export revenues.  
Table 5 presents some basic statistics on the two countries: 
Table 5: Selected statistics on Cambodia and Malawi 
 Cambodia Malawi 
Population (2012) 15 million 15.9 million 
Population growth (2012) 1.8% 2.9% 
Economic growth (2012) 7.3% 1.9% 
GNI per capita, PPP (2012) 2690 USD 753 USD 
Human Development Index ranking (2012) 138 170 
Net ODA received, % of GNI (2012) 6.1% 28.4% 
Source: World Bank 
For many decades, both countries have strongly depended on ODA and faced similar 
problems of fragmented support. While Malawi’s aid dependence has increased in recent 
years, Cambodia is performing better in terms of integration into the world economy and 
diversification of resources, mainly through remittances and foreign direct investment. 
When it comes to managing development cooperation through country systems, the 
countries show a rather different picture (see Table 6). In the case of Cambodia, the quality 
of country systems was assessed as increasing over time, as has the use made of these 
systems by donors. In Malawi, the quality of country systems has remained constant, while 
the use made by donors has fluctuated over time, in all years being higher than in Cambodia.  
Table 6: Selected statistics on development and aid effectiveness 
 Cambodia Malawi 
 2007 2010 2013 2007 2010 2013 
Quality of country systems11 2.5 3 3.5 3 3 3 
% of ODA using country PFM systems 14 21 32 55 65 50 
Source: World Bank, OECD / UNDP 2014 
                                                          
11  As per the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) index.  
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3.2 Efforts to increase ODA transparency and overview of CDS provided 
3.2.1 Cambodia 
Despite having a wide range of external partners who mainly deliver through discrete 
projects, the medium-term predictability for aid flows in Cambodia is nearly 100% and 
among the highest worldwide. In 2013, 79% of scheduled donor disbursements were on 
budget and the recorded funding was never higher than the scheduled disbursements 
(OECD / UNDP 2014). In 2005, the Royal Government of Cambodia (RGC) established 
the Cambodian ODA Database as a tool for information management, which in 2008 was 
extended with a separate database on NGO-activities. The databases are maintained by the 
RGC and serve as a strong example worldwide (Hattori 2009), with RGC officials actively 
engaging with donors to get sufficient information, and with adequate information being 
available on non-OECD partners, including China.  
The latest Cambodian Development Effectiveness Report estimated that in 2011 USD 
299.3 million or around 24% of total ODA received, was provided as TA. While the net 
value of ODA directed at TA remained roughly at the same level, fluctuating between 
USD 260–290 million per year between 2004 and 2011, it declined as a proportion of total 
ODA because an increasing amount of ODA goes to investment projects (CRDB/CDC 
2011a; CRDB/CDC 2013c). Figure 2 presents more detailed trends from the government, 
showing a growing proportion of loans received, while the proportion of TC remains more 
or less at the same level. 
Figure 2: ODA disbursements in Cambodia by type of assistance 
 
Source: reproduced from CRDB/CDC 2013c, 5 
The ODA database currently covers 2215 interventions (of which 642 are ongoing) by 14 
UN agencies, three international financial institutions (World Bank, IMF, ADB), the EU, 
the Global Fund, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (GAVI), and 19 
bilateral development partners (11 EU-member states, Australia, Canada, China, Japan, 
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New Zealand, South Korea, Switzerland and the USA). Among the 1413 projects that 
include details on the type of assistance provided, 844 (59.7%) were in the category of 
free-standing TC. The database provides the sub-types of (1) international expert, (2) 
investment/operational support & equipment and (3) other, but no disaggregated data is 
available for the 844 projects concerned.12 673 interventions (30.4%) partially or fully 
relate to the thematic marker ‘builds or strengthens Government’s capacity/system’, of 
which 393 were on-going in March 2014. 
3.2.2 Malawi 
The ODA management situation in Malawi shows important contrasts to Cambodia. 
Malawi managed to attract substantial shares of ODA in the form of General and Sector 
Budget Support as well as through other types of joint financing, yet recent analysis shows 
that despite these innovative approaches ODA has been extremely volatile and 
unpredictable. In the FY 2010/1113, aid disbursement increased by 7% from 2009/10 up to 
USD 1,022 million, while the most recent data for 2013 showed a reduction to USD 952 
million (MoF 2012, 16; OECD / UNDP 2014, 122–130). In addition, the proportion of 
funds provided beyond schedule was among the highest worldwide at 72%, and medium-
term predictability has been judged to be far below average (OECD / UNDP 2014). The 
following graph presents some trends in the way in which development cooperation is 
provided in Malawi, showing a strong increase in interventions delivered through discrete 
projects, which is likely to further increase following the Cashgate scandal due to which 
some donors are now unable to resume budget support. 
Figure 3: Aid disbursement by modality from financial years 08/09 – 10/11 
 
Source: reproduced from MoF 2012, 33 
                                                          
12  Data based on searches carried out in March 2014: http://cdc.khmer.biz/  
13  The FY in Malawi is 1 July – 30 June. 
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As a means of collecting and managing information on development cooperation, the MoF 
initially used an Excel template that donors used to report data on actual and planned 
disbursement on a quarterly basis (Development Gateway 2011). In 2008, the GoM 
adopted an online Aid Management Platform (AMP) in order to more comprehensively 
track and report external funding.14 The AMP is managed and hosted by the MoF Debt 
and Aid Division. Currently, the AMP has provided information about development 
interventions since fiscal year 2006/2007.15 The AMP is considered highly accurate and is 
seen to reflect the level of cooperation and trust between the MoF and donors, and was 
considered one of the most outstanding features of the aid environment in Malawi. The 
designation of a Data Focal Agent on the side of each donor, the provision of training on 
the use of the AMP to these agents, and the use of a traffic light report on donor behaviour 
in the Aid Atlas are other positive factors that have contributed to the proper functioning 
of the system (Fölscher et al. 2012b). 
According to government reporting, during the past and present decades the amount of 
reported TA declined in both absolute and relative terms. In FY 2006/07, around 5.1% or 
USD 16.8 million of total reported aid was directed at TA (AMP data), while in FY 
2010/11 only 0.8% or USD 8.2 million was dedicated to TA (MoF 2012, 17). In its most 
recent Aid Atlas, the government commented that the low reported amount of TA was 
because donors did not generally report on TA separately from grants.16 It added that this 
points to “de facto tying of some aid, with source country consultants and companies 
brought into the country to do work that could potentially be done domestically” and that 
the absence of separate reporting makes it difficult to assess whether the TA provided has 
contributed to the development of national capacity (MoF 2012, 17). 
3.3 Developmental patrimonialism and aid-dependence 
Recent studies on governance and socio-political change indicate that the transformation of 
both nations to a country with effective institutions (as per ‘Western’ traditions) is a more 
fundamental undertaking than previously assumed. In recent political economy research, 
both the Cambodian and Malawian states are described as ‘hybrid’ in the sense that the 
countries blend formally democratic institutions with strong elements of clientelism, and 
centralised, discretion-based leadership, in a combination that is referred to as neo-
patrimonial. Under such hybrid systems, the interests of elites conflict with mostly 
‘imported’ values, with the consequence that public-sector reforms will only be supported as 
long as elite interests are not seriously affected. There is increasing acceptance among some 
development academics and practitioners that it is neither realistic nor helpful to expect that 
these neo-patrimonial elements can be ‘overcome’ (see, for instance, Rakner et al. 2004; 
Booth et al 2006; O’Neil / Cammack 2014; Ngwira 2012; Hughes / Conway 2004; Jones 
2013; Jacobsen / Stuart-Fox 2013).  
                                                          
14  http://malawiaid.finance.gov.mw (accessed 19 Mar 2014).  
15  While data on the AMP is relatively up-to-date, the most recent aggregate report is the 2012 Aid Atlas 
reporting on financial year 2010/2011 
16  Ng’ambi (2010, 87) also noted that donors often do not include in the reported figures what they spend 
on TA or overseas direct procurement. 
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The same studies suggest that under certain conditions some neo-patrimonial states are 
‘developmental’ in the sense of being successful in terms of economic development and 
poverty reduction. As shown in the statistics presented at the beginning of this section, this 
seems to be more the case in present-day Cambodia than in Malawi, while both experience 
growing domestic pressure towards systemic change. Citizens in both countries consider 
corruption a huge social problem yet so far fail to collectively provide the sustained pressure 
for change that external actors are unable to impose. While there have been public protests 
in Malawi in 2011 and particularly in Cambodia after the 2013 elections, most people in 
both countries shape and maintain personal networks of their own, thus reproducing the 
patronage system. In the case of Cambodia, studies argue that informal systems of networks 
and patronage cause patrimonialism to dominate civil servants’ behaviour (Jacobsen / 
Stuart-Fox 2013). In the case of Malawi, this is not portrayed as a stable system, but as an 
escalating one, as it is argued that “The distribution of the spoils of office have taken 
precedence over the formal functions of the state, severely limiting the ability of public 
officials to make policies in the general interest” (Ngwira 2012, 26). 
Discussions on the policy implications of these studies suggest that development 
cooperation may be more effective if it attempts to strengthen the developmental tendencies 
of governance in states such as Cambodia and Malawi, as opposed to promoting good 
governance inspired by ‘Western’ standards. This requires dedicated research to distil a 
multi-stakeholder appreciation of the workings of neo-patrimonial regimes as a basis for 
adopting strategies that advance the developmental nature of the countries’ development 
path. Development cooperation can work ‘with the grain’ and be used to create space for, 
and facilitate the consolidation of, a middle class – a development considered key for 
improving developmental governance in both Cambodia and Malawi (Ngwira, 2012; Booth 
2012; Hugh / Conway 2004).17  
Although Cambodia has been more successful in diversifying sources of external finance, 
both countries’ governments continue to operate in a setting with a significant development 
cooperation footprint. In such a strongly aid-dependent setting, the best-educated people 
tend to work for donors or international NGOs, or are closely involved in implementing 
projects, meaning that they are not available in other economic sectors. Moreover, 
development assistance eases the pressure on government to increase domestic revenue 
mobilisation and raise salaries of civil servants. Although all donors will recognise that the 
governments of Cambodia and Malawi are in the lead and ultimately responsible for 
delivering essential services to their population, in both cases donors acknowledged a 
mismatch between the ambitious development goals on the one hand (e.g. free primary 
education, essential health services for all), and government capacity to deliver on these 
goals on the other. In both countries, donors and governments periodically agreed on a 
formulation akin to a ‘crisis’ situation to legitimise a substantial involvement by donors in 
making sure the services were provided.  
Contrary to the recommendations of the aforementioned political economy studies to ‘work 
with the grain’ and strengthen developmental governance aspects, donors and governments 
have mainly responded to the challenges at hand by shaping projects that addressed 
particular deficits and problems that were observed as hampering the achievement of the 
                                                          
17  The term ‘going with the grain’ was introduced in the research by the Africa Power and Politics 
Programme (Booth 2012). 
Reforming the hand that feeds you? Managing capacity development support in Cambodia and Malawi 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 21 
goals concerned. As many of these were delivered by or with the civil service, donor-
financed projects included salary supplements to civil servants as it was assessed that they 
would otherwise be insufficiently able to participate in the delivery of projects. 
Notwithstanding the successful use of these initiatives in individual cases18, the donor-
financed salary supplements have had the unintended effect of reducing demand for civil 
service reform in government (Godfrey et al 2002; Muula / Maseko 2006; Lindner 2013).  
The use of direct salary supplementation through projects has reduced in both countries in 
recent years, but donors have continued to provide supplementation and compensation of civil 
servants through other means. Principal among those are events such as ‘capacity 
development’ workshops, training and conferences. While allowances paid to participants in 
these events are formally meant to be compensatory, in reality most non-salary daily 
subsistence allowances (so-called per diems) are mostly perceived of as a form of additional 
salary payment (Linder 2013). Recent studies observe that an increasing amount of public 
spending in Africa is allocated to per diems and conclude that, as a result, many civil servants 
in these countries no longer primarily perceive such events as capacity development 
opportunities (Nklamleu / Kamgnia 2014; Soreide et al. 2012). Interviewees in Cambodia and 
Malawi shared examples of duplicated training sessions as well as a mismatch between the 
topic of the event and the participants sent by government, thus suggesting that government 
allocates training opportunities mainly in relation to the allowances to be received.  
In both Malawi and Cambodia the collection of events-related financial compensation, 
including per diems, comprises a substantial share of civil-servant incomes. Both countries 
show competition between donors over attracting government participants to their project 
events, as well as continuing discussions on harmonisation of rates and allowances systems, 
with different results. In Cambodia, some donors align to government per diem rates that are 
outdated and too low, whereas other donors do not.19 In Malawi, donors jointly decided to 
abolish cash payments to participants in response to the practice whereby these where 
mainly used as income-enhancing opportunities, which adversely affected the achievement 
of the objectives pursued by these workshops.20 This change has been resisted by 
Malawians, while donors found the government per diem rates too high (Soreide et al. 
2012). Interviewees in Malawi shared anecdotes of recent donor-funded workshops under 
the new rules that were boycotted by Malawian participants and had to be cancelled. In one 
case, the donor had to donate food to hospitals that had been procured for the event. 
Although, as a result, some donors felt compelled to break the rules and provide 
allowances21, other recent events in Lilongwe that no longer provided allowances were still 
attended by government. 
                                                          
18  See Land (2009) for an example of donor support to CDC/CRDB in which salary supplementation was 
but one element of a broader strategy to attract and retain competent and motivated staff members that 
increased their capacity to deliver CRDB’s mandate to advance aid effectiveness in Cambodia.  
19  Based on data collected in 1998 and 1999, Godfrey et al (2000) already signalled practices of donor 
competition and different project supplementation schemes. 
20  Interviewees shared examples of participants ‘workshop hopping’ (changing the workshop they 
attended for one that provided better rewards), while one interviewee mentioned always spending the 
first hour of a workshop clarifying the issue of allowances so as to ensure participants would 
concentrate afterwards (see also Soreide et al 2012 for a more detailed analysis).  
21  In this case this was observed and discussed among the Heads of Cooperation group.  
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As with many developing countries, both countries face structural problems in the provision of 
public services, which include the way in which the public sector relates to and with society at 
large, the low quality and relevance of formal education systems, as well as strong 
performance disincentives among civil servants (Wohlgemuth 2005). Government officials in 
both countries are understaffed and underpaid (both in absolute terms as well as in comparison 
to neighbouring countries), and cannot survive on their government salaries alone. Studies do 
point to fundamental public reform decisions that have been made in both countries, yet at the 
same time also observed how some key undermining aspects escaped reform for decades.22 
Studies report on high absenteeism and low effectiveness of the civil service in relation to 
formal mandates, while interviewees and political economy studies referred to above also 
point to strong ‘latent capacity’ in relation to the informal and ‘hybrid’ systems alluded to. 
These factors partly explain why technical advisors do not always sufficiently manage to 
transfer skills to government officials and ‘help them do their work’ but instead engage in 
capacity substitution such as by taking up management responsibility, and writing speeches 
and policy documents. Given these persisting challenges, it has been argued that the 
continuing prominence and prioritising of TC in aid-dependent countries like Cambodia and 
Malawi “is more a sign of previous failure than anything else” (Wohlgemuth 2005, 16). 
4 CDS on paper: overall aid management policies and priorities of 
Cambodia and Malawi 
4.1 Cambodia 
Following the 1993 General Elections, the RGC engaged in extensive planning activities 
and formulated national development strategies. While providing a strong overall policy 
framework, studies have argued that Cambodia’s fragmented institutional arrangement 
inhibits implementation, with several government agencies preparing national plans and 
strategies (Jones 2013). The overarching national development strategy does not have a 
strong relationship with actual financing decisions, which fall under the Ministry for 
Economy and Finance (MEF) for the national budgeting process, and the Cambodian 
Rehabilitation and Development Board under its Council for the Development of 
Cambodia (CRDB / CDC) for aid coordination and foreign investment (NGO Forum 
2013). Other studies detect improvements made to the planning process over time and 
present more positive overall assessments (VBNK/RBMG 2010). Table 7 presents an 
overview of key strategies on national development priorities and aid management that 
have been adopted.  
The four components of the current national development strategy of Cambodia (the 
Rectangular Strategy–Phase III) concern growth, employment, equity and efficiency. At its 
core is the goal of sustainable development, which requires good governance. In turn, good 
governance covers the four cross-cutting areas of combating corruption, judicial and legal 
reform, and reforms of public administration and the armed forces. The Strategy further 
specifies that “Cambodia aspires to reach the status of an upper-middle income country by 
                                                          
22  Civil service reform in Malawi is analysed in Anders (2009), while the efforts of Cambodia are 
described and assessed in Nunberg / Talierco (2012). 
Reforming the hand that feeds you? Managing capacity development support in Cambodia and Malawi 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 23 
Table 7: Overview of RGC development and aid-management documents23 
Timeframe National Development Policy Documents Aid Management Documents 
1994 National Programme to Rehabilitate and 
Develop Cambodia* 
 
1996–2000 Socio-Economic Development Plan I*  
1998 Triangle Strategy*  
2001–2005 Socio-Economic Development Plan II*  
2003 Cambodian MDGs Report24  
2003–2005 National Poverty Reduction Strategy*  
2004–2008 Rectangular Strategy I*  
2006  Strategic Framework for Development 
Cooperation Management* 
2006–2010 National Strategic Development Plan I*  
2008  Guideline on the Provision and 
Management of TC 
2008–2013 Rectangular Strategy–Phase II*  
2009–2013 National Strategic Development Plan I - 
Update 
 
2013–2018 Rectangular Strategy–Phase III  
2014–2018  Development Cooperation & 
Partnership Strategy 
Source: own elaboration 
2030 and a high-income country by 2050” (RGC 2013, 7). In line with this ambition, its 
priority areas include human resources development, trade and infrastructure, and 
improving the investment climate (RGC 2013). 
The four components of the current national development strategy of Cambodia (the 
Rectangular Strategy–Phase III) concern growth, employment, equity and efficiency. At 
its core is the goal of sustainable development, which requires good governance. In turn, 
good governance covers the four cross-cutting areas of combating corruption, judicial and 
legal reform, and reforms of public administration and the armed forces. The Strategy 
further specifies that “Cambodia aspires to reach the status of an upper-middle-income 
country by 2030 and a high-income country by 2050” (RGC 2013, 7). In line with this 
ambition, its priority areas include human resources development, trade and infrastructure, 
and improving the investment climate (RGC 2013). 
                                                          
23  Mentioning a single year under ‘timeframe’ means that the document was not adopted with a specified 
period of implementation in mind; ‘*’ indicates that the document has since been replaced. 
24  In 2003 the RGC adopted the Cambodian Millennium Development Goals (CMDGs), which sought to 
adapt the universal MDGs to the national context and added a ninth goal of de-mining, explosive 
remnants of war (ERW), and victim assistance, with the target of moving towards zero impact from 
landmines and ERW. 
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The management of external inputs to Cambodia’s development process has been guided by 
a Strategic Framework for Development Cooperation Management that was adopted in 2006 
and transposes key principles of the Paris Declaration to the Cambodian context. Following 
the Busan High-Level Forum of 2011, it was decided to review this framework and, based 
on this assessment, draft a successor policy. This Development Cooperation & Partnership 
Strategy seeks to cover the period 2014–2018 and was nearing completion at the time that 
this study was conducted. The new strategy’s main objective builds on that of its 
predecessor by aiming to “improve aid effectiveness to maximize its benefits for the people 
of Cambodia through strengthened national systems and procedures, and aid coordination 
and resource mobilization mechanisms that are based on principles of Cambodian 
leadership, ownership and mutual accountability (...)” (CRDB/CDC 2013a, 7). A key 
innovation of the new strategy is the introduction of specific indicators for promoting 
development effectiveness in Cambodia, of which several focus on the use and 
strengthening of country systems, which will be monitored by government through its own 
ODA database. 
In 2004, the RGC established the Joint Monitoring Indicators (JMIs) in an effort to link 
monitoring of the RGC and donors with the priorities of the National Strategic 
Development Plan (NSDP) and introduce results-based monitoring and mutual 
accountability. An important role has been played by Technical Working Groups (TWGs), 
which bring together stakeholders from across government, development partners and 
NGOs to agree and coordinate policies and sector plans. At a higher level of 
representation, the Government–Development Partner Coordination Committee (GDCC) 
was created with the intention of facilitating policy dialogue on limited issues that are 
strategic to development cooperation, such as the adoption of the JMIs. In addition, the 
Cambodian Development Cooperation Forum (CDCF) meets once every 18 months to 
review NSDP implementation as well as review opportunities for external resource 
mobilisation (CRDB/CDC 2013c; VBNK / RBMG 2010, 38). 
4.1.1 Cambodian policy priorities and strategies for CDS  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s a range of studies was published on the topic of TA in 
Cambodia (e.g. EON 2003b; Mysliwiec 2004), of which one was commissioned by the 
government’s Council for Administrative Reform (CAR) and carried out by the Cambodia 
Development Resource Institute (CDRI). By commissioning this study, the RGC 
implicitly raised its concern about the situation described in these reports, which signalled 
that most TC interventions were “donor-driven in their identification, design and 
implementation, to the detriment of institutional capacity development” (Godfrey et al. 
2000, 9). Parallel to the CDRI study, and conducted in the same period, a survey was 
commissioned by the CRDB that looked into CDS practices of donors and was planned in 
the context of wider government–donor discussions on reforming development 
cooperation in Cambodia (Siddiqui / Strickler / Vinde 2004). While responses from donors 
to the reports commissioned differed from welcoming to dismissive, government line 
ministries were broadly supportive of the need for fundamental changes in the 
management of TA. To take these intentions further, the studies called for developing a 
code of conduct to regulate TA, as well as suggested specific actions, such as the 
harmonisation of monetary incentives paid to civil servants by donors, and requiring civil 
servants recruited by donors to resign from their civil service positions.  
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Based on the study by Godfrey et al, the CDRI drafted a paper proposing key elements for a 
management framework on capacity development to the Council for Administrative Reform 
(CAR), which it proposed should be entrusted with the coordination of all capacity 
development programmes (FitzGerald / Strange 2004). This framework and the 
consultations held around it were to feed into CAR’s development of a master plan for civil 
service capacity development as part of the RGC’s 2006–10 National Strategic Develop-
ment Plan (NSDP). By July 2007 a concept paper of a ‘Policy on Capacity Development in 
the Cambodian Civil Service’ was ready, which was too late to feed into the national 
development plan. 
In the same period, the CRDB commissioned an independent study that had a similar 
mandate to the earlier CDRI study and looked into how both government and development 
partners can collaborate more effectively to generate the desired outcomes for TC (Land / 
Morgan 2008). On the basis of this study and other contributions, the CRDB drafted a 
position paper on the provision and management of TC in Cambodia. This position paper 
recognised that external partners cannot ‘do’ capacity development, but that TC should 
instead be “(...) cognizant of the operating environment and the broader change context, 
and this necessarily requires RGC leadership of a partnership-based approach to 
programming technical cooperation” (CDC/CRDB 2008, 2). The position paper 
announced the development of guidelines for the management of TC in Cambodia in order 
to improve the effectiveness of TC in Cambodia that were adopted later that same year 
(RGC 2008). Box 1 presents the five main guiding principles reflected in this document: 
Box 1: RGC guiding principles for the management of TC 
1. TC must support an internally led capacity development process rooted in national development 
priorities and planning processes. TC must include an analysis of the operating environment so that 
existing capacities and changes over time are widely understood and comply with RGC’s merit- and 
performance-based incentives. 
2. Capacity assessments should be the modality for defining ministry or sector-wide priorities, with the 
RGC’s preference for south–south based approaches using resources from the region a preferred 
option, implying a preference for the use of untied grant aid in financing technical cooperation 
activities. Technical Working Groups are the main forum for discussing TC between government and 
development partners.  
3. Country systems should be used for programming, budgeting, implementing and reporting TC, while 
exceptions must be elaborated and accompanied by time-bound steps towards increasing UCS in the 
future. PBAs, forms of co-funding or pooling, are the preferred options of delivery. If PIU are the 
only feasible alternative, they must be integrated with the RGC’s programming, implementation and 
monitoring.  
4. CDS requires joint management structures and monitoring criteria in a RGC-led process; donors must 
provide all details of TC to the ODA database. 
5. TC and its needs, implementation, delivery, management and monitoring must be linked with the five 
principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability as 
established in the Paris Declaration. 
Source: RGC 2008 
While these guiding principles seem clear and directed towards changing TA practices, the 
guidelines also include more ambiguous messages that reflect the accommodative nature 
of development cooperation management in Cambodia, which co-exists with policies to 
steer cooperation based on horizontal principles. In particular, although the guidelines 
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state unequivocally that “the prime rationale for using technical cooperation resources is 
to support capacity development”, the same section adds that “Additional technical 
cooperation functions can be justified in certain circumstances to be identified by 
Government. These include supporting project preparation, advisory services, evaluation, 
project management and implementation support” (RGC 2008). 
Four years after adopting these guidelines, CRDB analysis to prepare the successor aid-
management strategy indicated that both RGC and donors remain concerned with respect 
to the impact of capacity development and reform efforts over recent years. It observed 
that TC remains too technical and training-oriented, as well as insufficiently connected to 
government-led capacity-development processes. As a result, and in spite of government’s 
TC principles, TC remains “too often fragmented and related to project priorities rather 
than those of the broader sector/thematic context” (CRDB/CDC 2013d, 9). 
Given the challenges that remain, the second of three strategic objectives outlined in the 
Development Cooperation & Partnership Strategy 2014–2018 focuses on capacity 
development and systems strengthening (CRDB/CDC 2013a, 4). Although Cambodia has 
gone further than other developing countries in defining explicit policies and priorities for 
capacity development, its implementation and operationalisation of these principles has 
suffered from institutional fragmentation. As the TC guidelines specify, CRDB is 
responsible for development cooperation management, whereas the CAR is responsible 
for establishing policy on capacity development in line with the Rectangular Strategy and 
the Public Administration Reform program (RGC 2008). The non-adoption of the national 
capacity development strategy has thus also hampered the implementation of the TC 
guidelines. 
4.2 Malawi: National development plans and overarching cooperation strategies 
After independence in 1964, the policy priorities for development cooperation in Malawi 
were set by so-called Statements of Development Policies (DEVPOL) for 1971–1980 and 
1987–1996. From 1981 on, they were accompanied by a series of Structural Adjustment 
Plans. Due to unsatisfactory social and economic progress in Malawi, and inspired by the 
economic success of Asian countries, the government adopted the Vision 2020 as a 
National Long-Term Development Perspective for Malawi in March 1998. The document 
is still in place and is to function as an overall guideline for preparing short- and medium-
term plans. The main planning document is the second Malawi Growth and Development 
Strategy (MGDS II), which covers the years 2011–2016, in addition to the Malawi 
Economic Recovery Plan (MERP), which built on and prioritised particular elements of 
the strategy. While these overall strategies are in place, the implementation of these 
strategies is hampered in Malawi, as in Cambodia, by institutional overlap and conflicting 
mandates in government, in this case between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Development (Whitty 2010). 
Though adopted three decades ago, the Malawi Vision 2020 remains the overarching and 
guiding document for development planning. Against this overall vision, the main objective 
of the MGDS II is to reduce poverty by developing infrastructure and laying the foundations 
for sustainable growth. In order to obtain this goal, the MGDS II identified six priority 
thematic areas, as well as nine Key Priority Areas (KPAs) (GoM 2012). The resulting 
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strategy is extremely broad, and interviewees argued that it would be hard to do something 
that does not align to this strategy. The MERP, which was adopted under President Banda, 
prioritises those activities of the MGDS II that permit fast economic recovery and aims to 
reestablish GoM–donor relationships and correct monetary policies, thereby ensuring more 
focus (Ngwira 2012). Table 8 presents key documents guiding national development and 
cooperation management: 
Table 8: Overview of GoM development and aid-management documents25 
Timeframe National Development Policy Documents Aid Management Documents 
1971–1980 DEVPOL I*  
1987–1996 DEVPOL II*  
1998–2020 Vision 2020  
2001–2005 Socio-Economic Development Plan II*  
2001 MPRSP*  
2006–2010 MGDS I*  
2006–2011  Development Assistance Strategy 
2009–2010  Aid Management Policy 
2011–2016 MGDS II  
2012 MERP  
Source: own elaboration 
In 2006, Malawi adopted a Development Assistance Strategy (DAS), which presented 
government’s preferences and policies for the management of development cooperation. 
An Aid Management Policy adopted by the Ministry of Finance confirmed that 
government’s preference for budget support was already prioritised in the DAS, and in 
order to reduce transaction costs argued that it only supports projects that are over USD 5 
million in value, form part of a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp), and make use of country 
systems (Jimat 2010). Following the expiry of the DAS in December 2011, a review was 
commissioned by the MoF and finalised in mid-2012 (Saasa 2012). Together with the 
Malawi country evaluation under the Paris Declaration joint evaluation and its most recent 
monitoring survey, this independent study has informed government’s ongoing efforts to 
draft a new Development Cooperation Strategy (DCS) to replace the DAS and 
operationalise the MGDS II. The MoF has recently completed a first draft of this strategy, 
which will likely be updated and adopted after the May 2014 general elections. The draft 
of the strategy strongly prioritises the use of country systems and is committed to entering 
into regular dialogue with donors on the strengthening and use of national systems with a 
view to strengthening ownership, and sustainability, and reducing transaction costs. 
The DAS identified the lack of dialogue arrangements as a major obstacle to implementing 
the Paris Declaration and consequently establishing structures to allow for dialogue at 
                                                          
25  Mentioning a single year under ‘timeframe’ means that the document was not adopted with a specified 
period of implementation in mind; ‘*’ indicates that the document has since been replaced. 
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different levels among key stakeholders. First of all, a High Level Forum on Aid 
Coordination was created to bring together the GoM and donors to jointly address critical 
policy issues. An Intra-Government Coordination Group and a Development Partner’s 
Dialogue Group were put in place to ensure consistency on both sides and reduce 
transactions costs. In addition, 16 Sector Working Groups were put in place to focus on 
policy implementation, monitoring and capacity constraints. Though expected to increase 
national stakeholder capacities and knowledge on aid-effectiveness issues, especially on the 
line-ministry, devolved and civil-society-levels, independent studies considered that they did 
not yet work smoothly due to unclear ToR and a lack of guidance and coordination by the 
GoM (Saasa 2012; Jimat 2010). 
While Malawi has produced a series of ambitious national development plans, several 
studies conclude that the focus of these plans has been rather erratic and that there have 
been few efforts to promote consistent and well-integrated strategies at national and sector 
level (see, for instance, Cammack 2012). Interviewees said the same with regard to the 
donors engaged in Malawi. Other studies do detect a more careful trend of improvement, 
in the sense that, at an overall level, Malawi has successfully improved the quality of 
planning documents, while weaknesses are identified regarding their comprehensiveness 
and costing (Fölscher et al. 2012b). Research does, however, point to a consensus 
regarding a clear gap between the many available documents and strategies and the reality 
of more short-term decision-making (e.g. Booth et al. 2006; Rakner et al. 2004). 
4.2.1 Malawian policy priorities and strategies for CDS 
The DAS 2006–11 included a short yet instructive paragraph as regards government’s 
strategy towards technical assistance: “the government’s preference is for increased 
capacity development support and the minimisation of technical assistance, especially if it 
is not essential to implementing projects. The ministry and the [Office of the President] 
OPM will develop a technical assistance policy” (GoM 2007, 13). Further to this overall 
objective, studies detect a strong preference in the Malawian government for advisory 
rather than managerial TA and an aversion to donor attempts to use TA to encroach on 
decision-making (Fölscher et al. 2012; Jimat 2010).  
Despite these plans, no comprehensive horizontal CDS policy has been adopted by the 
GoM in the eight years since the adoption of the DAS. A recent independent evaluation of 
the DAS argued that this has made the aid-effectiveness discussions incomplete, and finds 
that the lack of a TA strategy has frustrated a number of capacity development efforts. The 
evaluation also argued that the absence of this strategy has prevented government from 
taking action against tied technical assistance and to promote more demand-driven TA 
(Saasa 2012, 26, 27). Interviewees expected that the new DCS alone would be neither 
operational nor explicit enough to fill this gap, but could play an important role by 
capturing government’s overall ambition as well as guiding the development of a policy 
on national capacity development. 
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5 CDS in practice: planning, managing and evaluating support in the 
health and education sectors in Cambodia and Malawi 
This section presents findings on the management of CDS in the health and education 
sectors in Cambodia and Malawi. It first presents a description of the evolution and key 
policies of the two sectors for each of the two countries in turn, and subsequently presents 
the findings from the interviews in both countries as to how CDS is planned, managed and 
evaluated.  
5.1 Overall characteristics and CDS policies in the health and education sectors 
5.1.1 Cambodia: health sector 
The health sector in Cambodia is highly dependent on external funding, which studies 
argue is partly due to the sector being of low priority to government, which spends only 
5.4% of its GDP on health (2012). Most external funding is delivered through discrete 
projects using individual procedures and structures prescribed by the donors, which has 
led to “an imbalance between allocations and expenditures, on the one hand, and national 
priorities, on the other” (Vaillancourt et al. 2011, iii). External support to the sector is, 
moreover, fragmented, with many health services provided through the private sector, and 
most donor funds being channelled through NGOs. This has led to uneven progress 
regarding the development of health-system capacity, with provincial and operational 
districts lagging behind (Land 2008; Vaillancourt et al. 2011). The MoH recognises that 
human resources are a critical factor and identifies the following main challenges: 
inadequate skills, competencies and management capacities; low salaries and motivation; 
and inadequate coordination of training activities (MoH 2008). 
In contrast to the challenges posed by low government investments, uneven capacity and 
fragmented external support, the health outcome results from the 2010 Cambodia 
Demographic and Health Survey were such that the team that conducted the 2011 HSP2 
Overall Mid Term Review stated being “hugely impressed by what the Cambodian health 
sector has achieved in a decade” (Martinez et al. 2011, 8). Donor interviewees recognised 
these gains, yet argued that much of these improvements had been of a ‘low hanging 
fruit’26 and argued that strengthening the capacity of the health system as a whole was key 
to ensuring more sustainable health outcomes and making the sector less dependent on 
external contributions. 
Both the health and education sectors are seen in Cambodia as frontrunners in terms of 
government’s promotion of aid-effectiveness principles, and were among the first to 
promote more coordinated and country-led approaches to planning development 
cooperation. The RGC envisaged the introduction of a Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp)27 
                                                          
26  One unpublished donor study suggested that improved access rates were significantly due to large inward 
foreign direct investment in infrastructure, particularly in roads, mainly financed by non-OECD donors.  
27  Under a Sector-wide Approach, “all significant donor funding supports a single, comprehensive sector 
policy and independent programme, consistent with a sound macro-economic framework, under 
government leadership. Donor support for a SWAp can take any form – project aid, technical assistance 
or budget support – although there should be a commitment to progressive reliance on government 
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in the health sector as early as 1999. As a first step, a Sector-Wide Management (SWiM) 
framework was introduced in 2000 that reflects an approach to sector-wide cooperation 
between donors and government, while giving donors more flexibility in the organisation 
and management of their interventions. Two successive Health Strategic Plans sought to 
manage the development of the sector in the periods 2003–2007 and 2008–2015, 
complemented by the Strategic Framework for Health Financing 2008–2015. These 
documents captured RGC’s intention to move from the SWiM towards a fully-fledged 
SWAp (VBNK/RBMG 2010, 48). Seven donors agreed in 2008 to contribute to the Health 
Sector Support Fund 2 (HSSP2) in an effort to provide more coordinated support. 
An external evaluation of the SWAp concluded that government’s overall strategy for a 
SWiM has not been clearly articulated and has led to different interpretations among key 
stakeholders, including donors. While the absence of a costed medium-term implementation 
strategy hampers alignment28, another key factor is the excessive earmarking and a 
‘proliferation’ of various pilot initiatives that lack proper evaluation investments 
(Vaillancourt et al. 2011). Although HSSP2 has, on balance, been judged as effective, its 
long-term results were hampered by the decision not to phase out a Project Implementation 
Unit in the MoH that was meant as a transitional measure. Four donors remain, yet at the 
time this study was concluded it was not clear whether the arrangement would be continued 
beyond June 2014. 
Studies on the health sector argued that the absence of a clear capacity development 
strategy makes it difficult for partners to harmonise and align external support behind a 
country-led process (Land 2008). The call for establishing a medium-term capacity 
development plan supporting the HSP-II is repeated in a later study (Vaillancourt et al. 
2011). The HSP-II 2008–2015 identifies human resources for health and health system 
governance as two of five strategic areas in the sector, which provides a foundation for 
engaging in a sector-specific capacity development dialogue (MoH 2008, 29; Land 2008). 
This foundation alone, however, provides insufficient guidance, and is by no means 
specific and concrete enough to provide a basis for dialogue and harmonised support. 
5.1.2 Cambodia: education sector 
The Cambodian education sector was among those most affected by the Khmer regime, 
which almost did away with the sector entirely and left behind few survivors with secondary 
or tertiary education. As a consequence, the 1980s and 1990s were characterised by 
rudimentary emergency reconstruction before more comprehensive sector development 
began in the late 1990s. Despite the strong needs for reconstruction and rehabilitation of the 
education sector, the RGC does not strongly invest in the sector, and in 2011 only invested 
the equivalent of 2.6% of its GDP, which is among the lowest in the world. The education 
sector is, moreover, still relatively dependent on external funding and is characterised by a 
high degree of dependence on external TA, which in 2008 accounted for nearly 50% of all 
disbursements in the sector. External support to the education sector is fragmented, and 
                                                                                                                                                                              
procedures to disburse and account for all funds as these procedures are strengthened” (OECD, 2006, 
706). 
28  One unpublished study argued that this is partly because of the MoH’s lack of transparency over its 
budget, with 60% of the overall MoH budget used for procurement.  
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features widespread donor and NGO-funded supplementation schemes (Hattori 2009; 
Nunberg / Talliercio 2012). 
The overarching planning document in the education sector is currently the Education 
Strategic Plan (ESP) 2009–2013, which was reviewed and updated in September 2010 to 
ensure consistency with updated national development strategies (MoEYS 2010). The ESP 
is operationalised and implemented by means of Annual Operation Plans (AOPs). In 
addition, in December 2012 the MoEYS launched a Master Plan for Capacity Development 
(MPCD) in the Education Sector 2011–2015 to implement the Plan and increase 
government ownership of the sectoral development process (MoEYS 2012). The ESP is 
expected to be succeeded by another ESP for 2014–2018, which was not yet completed at 
the time this study was finalised. 
As with the health sector, the education sector included early commitment to developing a 
sectoral capacity development strategy which lacked follow-up. In this period, the sector 
remained dependent on external TA, donors did not coordinate adequately, and monitoring 
and evaluation of CDS was poor. Instead of a sector-wide and partner-led approach, 
therefore, CDS was “organized on an ad hoc basis to respond to immediate and urgent 
needs, which are defined only in the context of particular programmes/projects” (Hatteri 
2009, 191). A strong signal to end this situation was given by the Ministry of Education, 
Youth and Sport (MoEYS) in 2012 when it adopted its Master Plan for Capacity 
Development in the Education Sector for the period 2011–2015, which seeks to promote a 
coherent, planned and comprehensive response to the sector as a whole (MoEYS 2012). 
Box 2 presents some key guiding principles of the Master Plan, which is currently the only 
one of its kind in Cambodia.  
Box 2: Overall approach and objectives of the Cambodian CD Master Plan 
A key basis for the Master Plan concerned a first Capacity Development Plan 2011–2013 that the MoEYS 
considers a milestone in a comprehensive, sector-wide approach to capacity development in the MoEYS. 
This strategy in turn facilitated the development of a Capacity Development Partnership Fund (CDPF) in 
2011, which was supported by the European Commission through UNICEF as a complementary measure to 
its provision of Sector Budget Support to the education sector. While not providing budget support, Sweden 
also contributes funds to the CDPF, while UNICEF, contributes financially as well as managing the fund. In 
the ministry’s own words, this fund allows donors to “support a more strategic approach, through provision 
of un-earmarked funding to support MoEYS capacity development priorities” (MoEYS 2012, 28). 
In line with its overall objective, the Master Plan seeks to promote the following seven strategic outcomes: 
1. Senior managers and directors at the national and sub-national levels deliver the agreed sector goals and 
outcomes through strong coherent and coordinated work; 
2. Strong systems and human capacity for analysis, planning, monitoring, review and evaluation at all 
levels; 
3. Legislation and sub-national democratic development reform supported and implemented in the 
education sector; 
4. Systems to manage, develop and incentivise human resources operate effectively, efficiently and 
equitably; and for effective administration, ICT and information management; 
5. Financial management and audit systems function efficiently; 
6. Good governance of all education programs and effective education quality assurance; 
7. National Institute of Education (NIE) and relevant higher education institutions conduct education 
management training and provide relevant, high-quality research and learning across the education 
sector. 
Source: MoEYS 2012 
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These seven outcomes represent a steep learning curve for the sector in the five years 
covered by the Master Plan, which identifies targets for 2015 for each outcome, as well as a 
2011 baseline and the main activities through which to promote the outcomes. The targets 
and baseline also form the Master Plan’s monitoring and evaluation framework. In reference 
to the distinction between functionalist and political dimensions of capacity change 
introduced in Section 2.2, all outcomes are oriented towards the functionalist dimensions, 
while changes in the political dimensions may be implied in outcomes 6 and 7. 
In the Plan’s foreword, the minister in charge of the sector urges all donors to commit to 
the implementation of the plan, “in the ways that best take into consideration their own 
comparative advantages” (MoEYS 2012, ii). This implies that government promotes the 
Plan’s implementation, but remains open to donors who wish to provide support on areas 
not covered in the Plan. 
5.1.3 Malawi: health sector 
Following the end of the Hastings dictatorship, health indicators worsened, with studies 
observing declining human resource levels and a collapse of public health services since the 
mid-1990s. Government reacted to the deterioration of the health sector by declaring a 
human resource crisis in 2004 (Palmer 2006). In response, donors supported a six-year 
Emergency Human Resources Programme (EHRP) that started in 2004 and resulted in 3,498 
additional posts filled between 2003 and 2007, including 33 medical officers, 253 clinical 
officers and 2,249 nurses. A needs-assessment study concluded that government’s decision 
to simultaneously create new posts in the health sector nonetheless meant that the vacancy 
rate remained the same at 46%. Moreover, key problems affecting the human resource crisis 
had not been addressed, such as unnecessarily complicated arrangements and weak human 
resources information that greatly hampers performance management (GTZ 2007). 
The sector has, for many years, received more development assistance than any other sector 
in Malawi and is well endowed with strategies, systems and processes (Options UK 2014, 
10). After four National Health Plans (NHPs), a SWAp Program of Work (PoW) was 
established in relation to the period from 2004–2010. The PoW was based on the concept of 
an Essential Health Package (EHP), which comprises a number of health services that are to 
be provided to the population without user fees. The PoW was extended by a Memorandum 
of Understanding between the GoM and development partners in 2004 to ensure the support 
and financing of the SWAp. Following the introduction of the SWAp, the donors’ share of 
funding to the sector increased from 30% to 56% between the financial years 2004/05 and 
2006/07 (Carlson et al. 2008, 12).  
In 2011, the extended PoW was replaced by the current Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP) 
2011–2016. A recent study considers that today both government and its donors show weak 
adherence to aid-effectiveness principles, and that alignment, harmonisation and 
accountability were stronger at the time of the SWAp’s introduction. In fact, the reduced 
harmonisation benefits some parts of the health system that now enjoy greater access to off-
budget resourcing. One worrying evolution in the overall health system is the deterioration 
of cooperation between government and the Christian Health Association of Malawi 
(CHAM), which has led to competent staff members from government and CHAM seeking 
employment elsewhere (Options UK 2014). 
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As things stand today, most of the support provided does not make use of country systems. 
Instead, most support is managed through projects with different financial and technical 
reporting obligations, as well as varying monitoring and evaluation requirements (Options 
2014). The Technical Working Group on Health (2014) identified that discrete funding is 
expected to exceed MoH funds by more than three times in FY 2014/2015. Furthermore, 
proliferation and considerable earmarking via vertical funds, special-purpose organisations 
or global programmes have continuously contributed to the complexity of the sector, which 
challenges government capacity and results in a fragmented and non-holistic approach 
(AfDB 2009, 14). One reason for this pattern of support is the poor functioning and 
performance of the public health system, which is illustrated, for instance, by chronic stock-
outs of essential medicines that benefit particular suppliers and individuals (Wild / 
Cammack 2013). 
The most recent CD-related policy in the health sector concerns the aforementioned EHRP 
that came to a close in 2010 (Palmer 2006). SWAp partners recognised early on that the 
ministry’s ability to implement the Programme of Work and deliver an Essential Health 
Package remained limited. In response, they commissioned two needs-assessment studies 
that respectively assessed the state of human resources and institutional capacity in the 
sector. These studies were expected to feed into an overarching capacity development 
strategy that was to be fed into the SWAp Mid-Term Review Process (GTZ 2007). The 
Mid-Term Review itself referred to the needs assessment but made no mention of such a 
strategy. It did observe a strong reliance on TA and volunteers in the sector, and argued that 
relying on such contributions was easier than “developing and implementing the longer term 
policies and strategies for sustaining the workforce” (Carlson et al. 2008, 69). 
During 2008 and 2009, the MoH produced a draft ‘Technical Assistance Management 
Strategy’, which itself largely relied on TA input and was not formally adopted by the 
ministry. The stated main aim of this strategy was to guide the ministry through a transition 
from the unsustainable use of TA for capacity substitution towards the use of TA for CDS 
and, ultimately, a graduation from this type of support. The process described in the strategy 
towards managing this transition emphasised the need to identify and streamline an external 
management contractor, and that the Secretary of Health should exercise ownership over 
TA, including taking responsibility for performance management, monitoring and reporting. 
The draft recommends the restructuring of TA approaches in three steps: (1) phasing out 
substitution and management roles performed by TAs; (2) strengthening and modernising 
training by incorporating elements of staff promotion and motivation; and (3) increasing the 
use of mentoring, coaching and backstopping (MoH 2009). 
The draft TA strategy saw strong potential in the creation of a pooled TA fund. As a follow-
up, the GTZ financed and carried out a study to assist in the appraisal of, and preparations 
for the establishment of, a TA pool. The study considered that integrating such a pool within 
the existing health-sector-basket funding programme was the most sustainable option, as it 
would not create a parallel structure and would work through government systems. This 
option however was seen as posing some constraints, namely a possible shortage of funds, 
inflexibility and bureaucracy, leading to delayed payment of TAs, and the “doubted 
acceptance of international level TA payments by ministry of Finance” (Kougbe 2010, 7). 
The second option of creating a separate TA pool would, though creating a parallel 
structure, pose some advantages in terms of mobilising resources and allowing for flexibility 
in salary ceilings. Finally, a third option was the status quo of providing discrete funding, 
which greatly limits possibilities for a sector-wide approach to CDS. The study noted the 
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preference of government and donors to promote ‘mixed pooling’, which involves 
separating responsibilities for recruitment from supervision, deployment and assessment 
(Kougbe 2010). Despite these preparations, no progress has since been made in terms of 
setting up this pool, with one of the reasons given being growing scepticism among donors 
about common funds. 
Officials in the MoH do recognise the need for better planning and management of CDS. As 
one key step, they see potential in a proper cost-benefit analysis of existing TA as a key 
input for an evidence-based discussion about the value of TA in the ministry, in recognition 
of the polarised views on TA among senior officials.29 One key step the MoH has recently 
taken was by supporting a detailed resource mapping of the sector to get a better view of the 
domestic and external funding to the sector. While to some extent representing a parallel 
effort to the aid management platform managed by the Ministry of Finance, the resource 
mapping does allow the Ministry to get a better and more centralised view of the total 
support to the sector, which it has used for several purposes, including its own dialogue with 
the Treasury (MoH 2014). 
5.1.4 Malawi: education sector 
The education sector in Malawi performs poorly compared to other African countries and 
faces numerous imbalances and inequalities, including urban–rural imbalances, high female 
dropout rates and low value for money despite high investment in higher education, with 
higher-education enrolment in 2010 among the lowest in the world and the lowest in Africa. 
Poverty, high HIV/AIDS rates and a growing population leading to an increase of the 
already large primary school age group (6–13 years) by an additional 20% between 2010 
and 2018, make the achievement of the education-related MDG literally impossible and 
undermine the struggle to notably improve the system in the short- and medium-term 
(World Bank 2010). As with the health sector, capacity development and human resources 
are among the most critical factors in the education sector and negatively affect the sector’s 
performance.  
Education planning in Malawi started with its independence in 1964 and resulted in two 
education-sector development plans that covered the periods of 1973–1980 and 1985–1995. 
A milestone was the decision to introduce free primary education (FPE) in 1994, which 
strongly increased access to both primary and secondary education but also placed 
considerable pressure on the education system that had to expand its human and physical 
resources. In the following decade, from 1995–2005, the education sector and the Medium 
Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) were guided by the Policy and Investment 
Framework (PIF), which was adjusted in 2001. The National Education Sector Plan (NESP) 
for 2008–2017 introduced a SWAp, and built on a variety of documents, including those just 
mentioned, the Vision 2020, the Education For All (EFA) National Plan of Action and the 
MGDS.30 The NESP guides the formulation of district-level plans and the development of 
                                                          
29  In relation to this, some interviewees argued that there was no such thing as ‘the ministry’s view’, but 
that, instead, individual middle-level officials and the ministry’s leadership tended to have their own 
views on the sector’s strategy and the importance of CDS. 
30  Some interviewees argued that MoEST never really managed to get the SWAp off the ground due to 
seeking to introduce it at a time when donors’ enthusiasm at entering into joint financing arrangement 
had dropped. 
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the Education Sector Implementation Plan (ESIP) 2009–2013, which serves as a bridge 
between the NESP and Annual Implementation Plans (AIP) (MoEST 2008, 2–3; Ng’ambi 
2010, 6; MoEST 2009, 9). 
While the above reflects important steps taken to ensure harmonised and aligned contributions 
from the international community, independent research points to a sector that continues to 
experience the ‘growing pains’ caused by the introduction of FPE. The government’s plans 
prioritised the decentralisation of education management to the districts, and sought to 
increase capacity at all levels.31 In contrast to the modest investments in expanding 
infrastructure, the sector has been seen as suffering from policy overload and implementation 
fatigue. Implementation also suffers from insufficient budgeting and shortage of teachers, 
whose distribution is strongly skewed to urban centres, thus giving Malawi one of the worst 
pupil–teacher ratios in the world at an estimated 92:1 in 2009 (Ng’ambi 2010). 
Not unlike the health sector, the Malawian education sector has been characterised as 
“awash in capacity strategies and plans”, as the MGDS, the NESP, the ESIP32, the 
capacity-gap analysis and the 2010 World Bank Education Country Status Report can all be 
considered capacity development strategies (USAID 2010, 8). In 2009 and 2010, the 
USAID sought to systematise these into an overarching sector CD strategy, yet the MoEST 
did not regard the strategy as its own and it instead evolved into a ‘situational analysis’ 
document, which described the state of play in the sector (USAID 2010). Donor officials 
active in the education sector indicated having had detailed discussions on setting up a TA 
pool in relation to such a strategy, but were unable to do so following challenges in public-
finance management in recent years and the Cashgate schedule in particular.  
Following the completion of the USAID-supported plan, the MoEST continued to develop a 
draft Capacity Development Strategy and Plan that was presented to ministry’s management 
in April 2014 and covers the period 2013–2017. The Strategy (2013) identified insufficient 
established posts; persistent vacancy rates combined with ineffective placement mechanisms; 
unclear responsibilities; inadequate transparency and accountability; and a lack of incentive- 
and career-development systems as major impediments to attracting and retaining staff in the 
sector. These were by no means new discoveries, as the sector had previously gone through 
studies such as a capacity-gap assessment conducted by GTZ in 2008/200933, as well as 
change-management events by DFID in 2011 and 2012 (MoEST 2013).  
The new draft strategy identifies key priorities and objectives for CD in the sector at a more 
specific and operational level compared to earlier documents, and beyond specific projects 
and interventions also proposes measures to address unintended negative effects of the CDS 
provided to the sector. It specifically seeks to reduce the time each staff member spends 
away from their desk for capacity development to a maximum of three days per year. It 
urges only sparing use of seminars and workshops and instead focusing CDS towards “(…) 
                                                          
31  Interviewees however noted that sector management remained centralised, with one interviewee 
mentioning that the MoEST still procures chalk centrally.  
32  The ESIP (MoEST 2009) emphasises especially the importance of developing leadership capacities 
within the Ministry and announced the formulation of a leadership development framework, though 
none of the interviewees was aware of concrete follow-up in this regard. 
33  As with the 2007 study in the health sector, this study assessed the state of play and challenges to capacity 
development in the sector, and assessed the feasibility of pooling TA in the sector (GTZ 2008). 
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on the job training (e.g. by TAs), coaching, mentoring, exchange visits and face to face 
training courses” (MoEST 2014: 20). Interviewees observed that the education ministry 
was these days making less use of TA based in the ministry compared with the previous 
decade, and saw this as a deliberate strategy on the part of the ministry. 
5.2 Planning interventions 
Following this overview of strategies and specific CDS priorities in the health and education 
sector in both countries, the following paragraphs will present general findings in relation to 
observed practices when it comes to planning, managing and evaluating CDS. 
First of all, both countries have invested in establishing consultative processes with 
international partners to discuss and agree on shared objectives for CDS. While some of 
these processes remained at a rather abstract level, and often refrained from making real 
choices, in both countries there have been attempts at joint planning of specific CDS 
interventions. During the ‘SWAp period’ in Malawi, large TA programmes were jointly 
discussed and agreed between the ministry and the donors in both the health and education 
sectors. In Cambodia, joint CDS planning only took place under the CDPF34 among the 
donors involved, as no other such initiatives had been taken further. 
Parallel to these joint efforts, and at a much larger scale, the practice continues whereby 
CDS projects are prepared on a bilateral basis between donors and the host ministry. This 
happens through processes ranging from detailed and participatory planning to cases where 
relatively concrete proposals are largely prepared by donors and subsequently presented to 
government officials for acceptance. Interviewees highlighted cases of overlapping TA (e.g. 
two donors seeking to provide TA on public–private partnerships in the Malawian MoH, as 
well as multiple PFM advisors in the MoF), contradictory advice by different TAs, or efforts 
to promote certain donor standards for financial reporting that were stricter than the ministry 
required. Some interviewees strongly argued that promoting ‘policy coherence’ among CDS 
interventions was more important than other issues that were more strongly debated, such as 
monetary incentives. 
While, in Cambodia, the education ministry’s leadership and capacity to negotiate with 
donors in relation to CDS was generally judged as stronger compared to that of the health 
ministry; in Malawi, this fluctuated in both ministries. In both countries, these differences 
were to a large extent due to ‘personalities’ and political leadership. Reports and 
interviewees acknowledge that donors in general do not manage to engage in planning joint 
interventions when this is not pushed by government. Donors could, for instance, exchange 
information on ToR content and periods of posting for advisors, but had not done so by 
means of forming separate groups or structured and frequent forms of exchange. Box 3 
illustrates the challenges posed by lack of joint action with regard to training in the 
Cambodian health sector. In relation to the low value of RGC-set allowances, interviewees 
suggested that some donors look for ways to provide additional incentives on an individual 
basis. Others argued that, because public health workers are so severely under-rewarded, 
                                                          
34  Despite this approach, the link to the implementation of SBS did lead its main donor to argue for 
specific TA support in the area of Public Finance Management as an accompanying measure. 
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they still mainly regard training as income-supplementation activities as opposed to learning 
opportunities. 
Box 3: Fragmentation and competition undermining value for money of training in Cambodia 
In the absence of a strong MoH push for coordination, donors did engage in their own initiatives to 
strengthen coordination, but these were often overtaken by events and bilateral priorities. An unpublished 
AusAid-commissioned Value for Money assessment of training in the health sector identified that in 2011 a 
total of 55 donors provided training assistance to the MoH, of whom 14 provided more than USD 100,000 
each. As donor-initiated efforts to harmonise the focus of these training efforts were not concluded, there is a 
high chance that training initiatives duplicated or overlapped. The report moreover noted that cumulative 
inflation of 60% since 1999 has greatly reduced the real value of RGC-set training allowances.  
Source:  Heijkoop et al. 2012 
When it comes to drawing up the details of specific support programmes with government, a 
similar range of practices was detected, from non-involvement to substantial government 
input. The fact that both extremes happen indicates that both the Malawian and Cambodian 
governments tend to be accommodative and flexible in terms of different CDS planning 
approaches. This flexible approach may also, however, indicate more diverse rationales for 
agreeing or not agreeing to CDS. Evidence from Cambodia suggests that even when 
government may not be convinced of the need for TA in a particular area, it may still accept 
the CDS project due to the additional project resources that TAs are ‘packaged’ with. This 
confirms the findings of earlier studies that signal ‘tolerated TA’ (e.g. Land / Morgan 2008). 
TAs that come without such project resources or even require additional investments to be 
made by government are not always accepted by all ministries for this reason35, but at the 
same time acceptance of such inputs by ministries was seen by some interviewees as a more 
reliable indication of genuine demand for CDS.  
In the case of Cambodia, interviewees confirmed that government pursues an implicit policy 
whereby they prefer to receive CDS in the form of grants, with only exceptional cases of 
CDS funded through loans.36 While the CDC/CRDB is in charge of coordinating grant-
based aid, the management of loans fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance (MEF). Loans have to be prepared and managed in accordance with detailed 
Standard Operating Procedures devised by this ministry (MEF 2012). While being very 
detailed about the preparation of loans, which includes the use of country systems, some 
donor officials ironically referred to it as ‘country systems for donors’, given that the RGC’s 
own practice of developing programmes strongly differed from the description in its manual. 
The different TC projects that were described in the interviews showed strong variations in 
terms of mandates and objectives. Some advisors were mainly mandated to facilitate the 
implementation of particular projects, both long-term, such as for the global funds, and 
short-term, when carrying out more ‘extractive’ work in terms of project M&E. Others had a 
genuine capacity-development focus, but their individual ToRs differed in the degree of 
                                                          
35  Examples include Integrated Experts provided through German cooperation (http://www.cimonline.de/ 
en/profile/2155.asp) and Overseas Development Institute (ODI) fellows (http://www.odi.org.uk/ 
fellowship-scheme) (both accessed 14 May 2014).  
36  One example funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is described here: http://www.adb.org/ 
projects/43260-013/details (accessed 15 May 2014) 
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flexibility and density of deliverables the donor requires. A third group consisted of advisors 
who mostly had a supervisory role, such as TAs posted to the Malawian MoF following the 
Cashgate scandal, or who have to monitor and authorise project expenditures. Finally, and 
cutting through these categories, there were many cases where what an advisor did strongly 
differed from the content of the ToR, for instance TAs who were mainly project-
implementation focused yet oriented themselves towards coaching and mentoring as a result 
of delays in project implementation.37 As a result, government officials were sometimes 
either uninformed as to the mandates of individual advisors based in their ministries, or 
indicated opinions saying that their mandates were ambiguous.  
No evidence was found that the two governments directly pushed for the use of country 
systems in relation to CDS, apart from the case of the health TA pool in Malawi. Instead, 
they pushed more broadly for the use of PBAs (Cambodia) and budget support/SWAps 
(Malawi) that would imply changes for the management of TA and other forms of CDS. 
The Cambodian CDPF does imply different roles and responsibilities for both government 
and donors compared to mainstream projects, as described in Box 4.  
Box 4: Managing government-led CDS support – design features of the Cambodian CDPF 
The CDPF consists of financial contributions from the EU, Sweden and UNICEF, with total pledges of over 
USD 14 million, of which the largest share is provided by the EU, and which supports the implementation of 
the ministry’s CD master plan in the period from 2011 to 2014. The CDPF supports capacity development at 
four levels:  
x Sector institutional capacity in planning and managing policy and regulatory reforms; 
x Central Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport (MoEYS) capacity in planning and management 
processes; 
x Organisational capacities at provincial and district level for improved service delivery; 
x School management and education service delivery through increased community involvement and 
governance arrangements. 
The following seven types of support are provided by the CDPF, with an estimated 85% of the fund targeted 
at sub-national levels:  
1. Financial support for MoEYS (national & sub-national) 
2. Technical advisors  
3. NGOs and institutions  
4. Institutional twinning, external training and study visits 
5. Equipment 
6. Visibility and communication 
7. UNICEF management and monitoring. 
The prioritisation and implementation of the fund was guided by a separate monitoring and evaluation 
framework that associated specific capacity-development outcomes to the Master Plan’s outcomes, which 
formed the basis for planning programmes and activities funded through the CDPF. Implementation of the 
fund is overseen by a steering committee led by the MoEYS, while efforts are made to avoid duplication 
with CDS interventions financed by the Global Partnership for Education and the Asian Development Bank. 
Source:  Boak (2013); UNICEF (2013; 2014) 
                                                          
37  The Paris Declaration evaluation noted that this led to capacity distortion, as officials were trained in 
meeting donor project procedures as opposed to their own (Jimat 2010). 
Reforming the hand that feeds you? Managing capacity development support in Cambodia and Malawi 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 39 
While seeking a government-led and coordinated approach, the CDPF was challenged by 
having to fund activities that blurred the line between operational and investment costs, 
such as the procurement of motorcycles (UNICEF 2014). This should not, however, be 
seen as a reason to refrain from investing in such projects through coordinated approaches. 
As was shown in Malawi, the inability of individual CDS projects to fund recurrent costs 
may render their capacity development interventions redundant since, due to Cashgate, 
government funds to hospitals were rapidly drying up and did not allow health workers to 
translate theory into practice.  
5.3 Procurement and recruitment 
The general picture from both countries is one whereby the recruitment of TAs is led by 
donors with differing levels of government input, as opposed to under government 
leadership. Donors differ in the degree to which they involve governments in recruitment, 
regardless of whether this is done by an implementing agency mandated by the donor, or 
through procurement, when the assistance is sought by means of a public call for proposals. 
Anecdotal evidence suggested that in some cases it still happens that most of the preparation 
is done internally and that government is invited to endorse the result of the recruitment 
process through a ‘no objection’.  
Interviewees further noted that the procedures of some donors (both bilateral and 
multilateral) formally exclude government from involvement in decision-making. Some 
donors did, however, indicate that they would informally seek government’s feedback 
once a shortlist of candidates has been prepared, in which case government is allowed to 
screen the CVs of the candidates. 38 This practice should not be linked to donor policies 
and procedures alone, but also to government’s inability to free up sufficient time and 
resources needed to adequately engage in demanding recruitment processes, which, in 
both countries, government was not always willing to do. Instead, it still happens that 
donors’ implementing agencies design, recruit and deliver TA projects relatively 
independently from government, which may be convenient for government but may also 
indicate that government is more interested in the additional project budget than in the 
CDS per se. It would indeed be logical for government to seek a strong involvement if it 
was intent on using the external advisors to maximum benefit.  
Even though Cambodia’s TC guidelines call for an increased use of regional capacity 
development resources, and the Malawi DAS implicitly seeks to move away from 
international TA, no evidence was found of specific cases of ‘affirmative action’ towards 
employing TAs from the region. There was, instead, an implicit understanding that, for 
certain objectives of CDS support, ‘local TAs’ were best placed (e.g. when considerable 
internal networking is required), while for other CDS objectives it was best to have an 
‘outsider’ come in with a fresh look on things. Though in both countries there have been 
experiences with international TAs who were too young and inexperienced and/or failed 
to ‘blend in’ with organisational processes and culture, none of the interviewees felt that 
                                                          
38  One interviewee suggested that, in the case of Cambodia, giving government too much influence over 
recruitment would reduce gender equality of advisors, as many senior government officials prefer male 
advisors.  
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local or international TAs were inherently better or otherwise preferable. The high salaries 
and compensations received by international TAs were, however, seen as a factor limiting 
their integration into the ministries where they are placed. 
Among the positive cases observed, DFID has funded large TA programmes to support 
the Malawian MoH and MoEST under the respective SWAp periods, with one of the 
advisors financed through the Flemish International Cooperation Agency (FICA) via a 
silent partnership. The starting point was a joint identification of TA needs by the ministry 
concerned and the donors active in the SWAP, and care was taken to involve both the 
donors and government in the recruitment processes that led to the recruitment of both 
international and local (including regional) advisors. After the interview process, a mix of 
international and local TAs were recruited and posted in the ministries, and it soon 
emerged that among both international and local TAs there were both high- and low-
performing advisors. Government chose to end the contracts of those local and 
international TAs who were found to be not performing. 
Some donors indicated, moreover, that they used different recruitment approaches for 
different TA purposes, and would involve government less in the recruitment of advisors 
with project-implementation responsibilities and more in the case of advisors with a pure 
CDS mandate. In the case of Germany, one main reason for this is that some CDS 
advisors require government co-funding (in the case of so-called ‘integrated experts’, or 
CIMs after the German acronym) and thus necessitate a stronger involvement from 
government’s side. In Malawi, the same was found for ODI fellows who, contrary to other 
TAs, only formally report to the partner-country government and, as with the CIMs, 
require a government contribution. Given these contributions, co-funded advisors in 
Malawi were seen as closer to the ministry employees and, to some extent, different from 
other advisors.39 
When it comes to the functioning of TAs, interviewees unanimously felt that the 
difference between well-functioning and non-performing technical advisors is mainly 
explained by ‘soft’ issues such as personality (referred to as ‘chemistry’ by other 
interviewees), trust and sensitivity, as opposed to what they know as experts. When 
contrasting this widely shared insight into the recruitment processes, a clear discrepancy 
emerges, as these processes do not primarily focus on recruiting advisors in relation to 
these personal traits. Instead, recruitment generally tends mainly to focus on more 
objectively verifiable and comparable aspects such as qualifications, technical skills and 
years of experience. To a large extent this is understandable as it allows for a more 
‘objective’ recruitment process, which may be required, in particular, when both 
government and donors are involved and need to reach a common assessment. It also is an 
easier and cheaper assessment to make as it is largely desk-based.40 
                                                          
39  This was, however, not a general rule as there were also 100% externally funded advisors who were 
seen as fully integrated in the ministry. 
40  Donor officials in Malawi added that in several cases the government went for a candidate with higher 
academic qualifications than the one preferred by the donors, and that this candidate in some cases did 
not finish his or her contract due to non-performance, thus illustrating that it is not just donors who are 
too focused on objective criteria.  
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5.4 Day-to-day management of capacity development support 
When it comes to day-to-day management of CDS, and TA in particular, the general picture 
emerging from the two countries is that most donors still work with the TA-counterpart 
model, whereby the local or international TA is ‘paired’ with an individual government 
official. This individual would then be the centre of daily interaction, in addition to having a 
more formal focal point at the management level to which the TA reports on a periodic 
basis. Given problems of underpayment and absenteeism, it frequently happened that 
counterparts were transferred or otherwise unavailable during the period of TA postings, in 
Cambodia even in cases where the Ministry had made formal promises on the availability of 
the counterpart concerned. Several cases showed that successful TAs managed to work in 
much wider networks of officials, which in most cases was due to government actively 
managing to make that happen. 
In addition to the counterpart, the TA in question would in most cases also have formal focal 
points in the local office of the donor funding her or him, with some donor officials referring 
to TAs in the ministries as ‘their eyes and ears’. Given that advisors can also have reporting 
obligations to a recruitment (or implementing) agency in cases where the donor concerned 
used an intermediary, they may in practice have as many as three bosses, who do not 
necessarily steer them towards the same objectives and deliverables.  
TAs are not uncritically accepted in the different line ministries, and in both countries there 
was evidence of government departments refusing to accept TAs. In Malawi, it does happen 
that contracts of underperforming advisors are ended after an initial period. Interviews in 
Cambodia pointed to cases of ‘passive resistance’, thus confirming the findings of earlier 
studies that government officials do not fire but instead ‘ignore’ TAs who underperform or 
otherwise fail to integrate into the job (Land / Morgan 2008). 
In managing TA, while the donors in particular consider the ToRs as the primary instrument 
to make sure the TA sticks to the agreement, both government and donor bosses may pursue 
additional objectives and interests beyond those listed in the ToRs. In the case of donors, 
there is often felt to be a need to use ‘their’ TA to help them learn about how government 
ministries operate, and to gain information on key change makers in the ministry as well as 
following policy and implementation processes. Advisors try to reconcile and harmonise 
such additional objectives, yet are typically not able to accommodate everything, mainly 
because inconsistent demands can undermine overall effectiveness. Having two bosses can 
occasionally also lead to authority problems as well as non-availability of the advisors, e.g. 
because they are ‘summoned’ to an embassy to share information. On the other hand, some 
government officials, particularly in Malawi, tend to use advisors to communicate 
potentially contentious messages to donors, as they are known to be able to express 
themselves more freely and directly. 
In both countries, cases were identified in which donors became concerned when advisors 
began to deviate from ToRs but government continued to value their work.41 In those cases, 
                                                          
41  It is not unlikely that there were instances of the opposite occurring: of TAs valued by donors being 
perceived critically by government. But no specific cases were discussed, apart from the toleration of 
TA in Cambodia or the escalation and/or termination of TA contracts in Malawi. Both actions can, 
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ending the contract of such an advisor could affect the relationship between the donor and 
government, but donor officials indicated still having to take such decisions in some cases. 
Examples such as these point to ownership issues, given that in principle once a donor 
provides an advisor this person should come under government management. This dilemma 
is not unlike the provision of financial support, including budget support, where government 
is formally in charge of spending it in relation to their plans and priorities but the donor is 
engaged in ongoing dialogue seeking to influence how the money is spent as well as on 
what. 
Looking back on their posting periods, TAs argue that in the first months, in particular, they 
tend to closely follow requests from government. Whether this is in terms of being more 
hands-on than their mandate requires, or is completely unrelated to the mandate (e.g. 
providing after-hours support to government officials engaged in university courses), it is 
through these first tasks that a TA can ‘prove his/her worth’ and develop a relationship of 
trust. TAs presented specific examples of government officials asking them to assist in 
relatively straightforward tasks, in itself an act of trust as it may, for instance, involve 
admitting lack of understanding of computer programmes. Following these more basic 
tasks, the TA and government official concerned then gradually grow into collaborations of 
a more sensitive nature, more directly related to the advisor’s ToR. 
One principal and generally occurring deviation is that TAs often become more engaged in 
more ‘capacity substitution’ than the ToRs ask for; this has the potential to undermine the 
motive for providing support if it prevents the ministry from developing its own capacity in 
the area concerned. While many ministry officials are highly committed and hard-working, 
ministries visited in both countries are typically understaffed and their officials underpaid, 
which means they are generally ill-prepared to meet the generally highly ambitious work plans 
agreed with the donors. While governments are therefore best placed to manage TAs in a way 
that avoids capacity substitution, more so than the donors funding the TAs, capacity 
substitution does not always take place due to government demand but when the unit in which 
the TA is located fails to provide adequate management. In those instances, it is very likely 
that the advisor in question, typically a motivated and dynamic individual with a strong ‘can 
do’ attitude, engages in capacity substitution out of fear of having no work to do.  
While on paper most donors still work with the TA-counterpart model, despite the clear 
risks this approach poses in terms of low sustainability and capacity substitution, important 
innovations are also taking place that specifically try to improve sustainability chances, such 
as the project described in Box 5. 
In addition to the strong salary differences between advisors and government officials, 
many interviewees indicated that relationships were also unequal in other respects. In 
Malawi, examples were given where a TA failed to perform in the education ministry 
because of personal reasons, in this case also linked to the TA having lower qualifications 
yet a higher salary than their counterpart, with the counterpart reportedly asking “is this 
my technical assistant or my technical advisor?” In this particular case the TA was part of 
the project developed by the ministry and the SWAp donors that, from a more holistic (but 
                                                                                                                                                                              
however, be seen as ‘coping strategies’, but are not effective in improving CD through external 
support. 
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Box 5: Integrating TAs into line positions in Malawi’s Local Councils 
In 2010 the GoM devolved key responsibilities for nine sectors to local authorities, which required some 
of the resources for these sectors being channelled directly from Treasury to each respective local 
authority. Accompanying the implementation of this devolution policy, GoM rolled out an Integrated 
Financial Management System (IFMIS) to local authorities. To facilitate this process GoM implemented a 
Joint Capacity Development Programme for Governance (JCDPLG I) with support from Irish Aid and 
GTZ, which covered 30 of the 34 local councils of Malawi. The CDS provided included support in terms 
of human resources development, equipment and training for financial management and accountability, as 
well as development planning, monitoring, and evaluation and governance of service delivery.  
One observed challenge of the devolution process was the difficulty of attracting and retaining highly 
qualified people to work at the financial departments of the local authorities. The project supported the 
recruitment of University of Malawi graduates as Financial Analysts (FAs) on a non-established position 
basis for a minimum period of one year. The Ministry recruited and deployed the FAs to the local 
authorities with an agreement that, depending on their performance, successful FAs would be absorbed 
into the mainstream civil service. 
A survey carried out in 2001 in 18 districts, and monitoring visits, show that there is generally an overall 
positive perception among district staff that the FAs have contributed to an improvement in the 
production of financial reports, the maintenance and production of books of accounts, and adherence to 
internal controls. However, individual performance and effectiveness varied from district to district due to 
a number of factors such as the delays in government facilitating integration of FAs, as well as role 
conflicts and resentment among existing staff due to salary issues. GoM subsequently absorbed the FAs in 
the mainstream civil service by engaging them on permanent terms as part of the full Council 
Establishment as Chief Accountants. 
Source:  IrishAid (no date) 
also top-down) perspective, determined which departments needed CDS, yet did not look 
into whether the departments were willing and able to absorb such support. One interviewee 
suggested that part-time TA positions would be less prone to undermining the authority of 
counterparts as well as better placed for hands-off approaches. TAs are often recruited on a 
full-time basis by default, mainly because in the case of international TAs they would travel 
to the country for the job.  
For successful management of CDS, it can be concluded that an ‘enabling environment’ or 
essential conditions need to be in place before external CDS can contribute to capacity 
development. Although levels of staff and salaries do influence outcomes, domestic 
stakeholders from Cambodia and Malawi indicated that culture, mindsets and ethics were 
more significant. It was thus argued that simply increasing civil servant salaries would not 
do the trick, but broader societal changes that place a stronger demand on the public sector 
are required, which in turn would stimulate the public sector to develop and implement a 
clear-cut strategy towards drawing on external CDS. While the current situation does not 
rule out islands of capacity in particular units or departments, these results often did not 
manage to lead to improved sector results and ministerial capacity as these islands need 
the buy-in and cooperation of other departments (e.g. HR or finance) and committed 
political leadership in order to achieve lasting effects.  
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5.5 Monitoring and evaluation 
In Cambodia, in particular, several studies have been carried out that presented an overall 
evaluation of the CDS received. While Land (2008) has a sector-specific focus, others look 
either at the overall level (e.g. Siddiqui et al. 2004; Land / Morgan 2008) or have a more 
descriptive character (Craig et al. 2010). In the case of Malawi, the recent independent DAS 
evaluation presented a similar overall assessment to that made for Cambodia, namely that 
the increases in capacity were in no way commensurate to the amount of TA support 
provided (Saasa 2010). In both countries, a general feeling of unease among donors and 
government alike was observed: while government cannot explicitly criticise specific donor 
CDS practices in public as it might run the risk of losing support, donors, in turn, have few 
incentives to critically evaluate their own CDS practices and make results public, since they 
might be accompanied by reputational risks on the individual and/or organisational level. 
Both countries have set up sectoral working groups that facilitate donor–government 
interactions, and offer a means to donors for ex-ante coordination of CDS and for information 
exchanges such as reports and ToRs. When it comes to CDS, however, many donors still 
prefer to manage this bilaterally with government. As a result, key documents on CDS, such 
as ToRs, and mid-term or project completion reports are not systematically shared with other 
donors or beyond the direct counterpart division in the ministry. In the case of Cambodia, the 
government has signalled that it would prefer a more centralised approach, and in a recent 
document criticised the practice of donors who enter into bilateral agreements with line 
ministries and agencies without prior notice being given to the CRDB/CDC as the designated 
coordinating body (CRDB/CDC 2013a, 4). Such practices, however, would not seem to be 
grounds for government to reject the assistance offered, and therefore are, de facto, tolerated. 
While donors may not always circulate ToRs to other donors, the same goes for the 
government departments concerned, who may not share project reports and progress 
documents more widely in the ministry. This is most often a reflection of the case that intra-
ministerial information sharing is generally low and in need of improvement, e.g. because 
computers are not connected to an internal network or intranet.42 In the case of TAs, this 
lack of transparency adds to the existing suspicion of, and prejudice towards, TA among 
some senior officials in the ministry. Evidence gathered in the interviews thus suggests that 
the lack of transparent assessment of the cost-benefits of TA has negatively affected the 
effectiveness of TA in both countries, particularly as many donors have weak institutional 
memories in this area of support. 
CDS interventions are rarely evaluated, and such reports are often not shared outside the 
small group of donor and government officials directly involved in managing the project 
concerned. A recent evaluation concluded that, in the case of workshops and other events, 
the typical ‘end of workshop evaluations’ say little about participants’ actual use of what 
they learned and the effect this had on their performance, and therefore risks perpetuating 
ineffective or non-relevant workshop practices. This may confirm developing-country 
participants’ perceptions that these workshops are not about CD but just about income 
supplementation (Soreide et al. 2012). In the case of TA, the dominant approach for 
assessment seems to be self-reporting by the TA. Another related problem is the lack of 
                                                          
42  Some advisors in Malawi indicated having to keep their computers separate as many government PCs 
were virus-infected. 
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handover to successor TA projects, often due to contractual reasons in cases where there is a 
gap between the start of one project and the beginning of its successor. This means that 
many TAs have to reinvent the wheel, e.g. find out how to write memos in ministry-
appropriate language. One observed exception was that of the ODI fellows, who tend to 
introduce their successors to key contacts in the ministry for a period of some weeks. 
6 Discussion and conclusions 
6.1 Analysis of findings 
Contrasting the research evidence gathered with the table of good practices on effective 
capacity development support (see Table 4), the following overview of findings can be 
presented. 
Table 9: Main findings in relation to management of CDS in Cambodia and Malawi 
 Planning Identifi-
cation and 
design 
Budgeting Procure-
ment and 
recruitment 
Implemen-
tation 
Monitoring 
and 
evaluation 
 UCS dimension 1: Planning and 
budgeting 
UCS 2: PFM UCS 3: Oversight 
and evaluation 
Partner  Failure to 
define CD 
objectives at 
operational 
level and to 
actively share 
and discuss 
these with 
donors  
Some 
incremental 
progress in 
joint 
planning, yet 
many donors 
lack 
flexibility in 
the type of 
support 
provided 
 
Increasing 
financial 
transparency  
linked to 
partner ODA 
databases  
Possibilities 
created to 
report CDS 
on budget 
 
Government 
does not use 
all oppor-
tunities for 
engagement 
in procure-
ment, often 
leaving it to 
donors 
Reporting on 
CDS to 
government 
leaves much 
to be 
desired, and 
knowledge 
management 
of TA 
outputs is 
poor 
Low 
involvement 
in and 
demand for 
evaluations 
of CDS 
Donor Efforts made 
to link to 
processes and 
strategies 
Most CDS 
remains off-
budget and 
managed 
through 
discrete 
projects 
Not all 
donors allow 
for strong 
involvement 
of partners 
Most CDS is 
primarily 
accountable 
to donor 
Internal 
reporting not 
always 
shared with 
partner; low 
appetite for 
individual or 
joint 
evaluation of 
CDS 
Some CDS 
packaged with 
other 
interventions; 
perceived as 
conditional 
Continued 
formal and 
informal 
tying 
Occasional 
authority 
problems 
with TAs 
who get ‘too 
close’ to 
government 
Source:  own elaboration 
One important overall impression from this overview is that whereas one would expect 
donors to be most change-resistant in relation to UCS dimension 2, they have also made 
very low progress in the other two dimensions. As has been described in Section 5, the 
main reason for this is that neither government nor donors have strong incentives to 
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change the present situation of mostly bilateral, ‘anything-goes’ types of CDS, which lack 
transparency and, as a rule, are not critically evaluated. 
The cost of bilateral approaches is that each donor makes its own capacity analysis. 
Occasionally these are shared with selected other donors, but their more project-oriented 
nature generally makes them inadequate to identify real change constraints and prospects 
for progress that would serve as a basis for joint support. Instead of helping to target 
political dimensions of capacity and areas that would be contentious but have much 
change potential, the resulting support instead mostly focuses on functional capacity 
dimensions as per the practice of linking to government’s generally expressed capacity 
plans. When contrasted to the key enablers for effective cooperation (Messner / Guarín / 
Haun 2013), although it is clear that the asymmetrical relation of development cooperation 
discourages reciprocity as the fundamental principle, the findings show that accountability 
relations are often dysfunctional and undermine the other enablers of trust, fairness, 
reputation and communication. The main reason for this is that many externally financed 
advisors face conflicting demands from government and donor clients, a critical issue that 
was already picked up in earlier evaluations (see, for instance, Land 2007), but remains 
neglected in practice. 
Substantial challenges thus remain and have been insufficiently looked into, and based on 
these findings the following closing sub-section sets out the paper’s main conclusions and 
recommendations. 
6.2 Conclusions and recommendations 
This paper analyses the policies and priorities of the governments of Cambodia and Malawi 
with respect to capacity development support (CDS), based on secondary research evidence 
and perceptions of effectiveness from a wide range of stakeholders. The study concentrates 
on the two governments’ overall objectives and strategies on CDS and contrasts these to the 
situation in the health and education sectors, as two sectors that generate a strong need for 
capacity development and attract a significant portion of development cooperation. While 
CDS is provided in many forms, this study has restricted its analysis to dedicated events and 
advisory services. 
A first observation of this study is that as longstanding aid-dependent countries, Cambodia 
and Malawi provide a ‘disabling environment’ that hinders the effective management and 
use of external support for capacity development. Both countries are characterised by a 
highly politicised civil service that is part and parcel of a neo-patrimonial governance 
system, where civil servants themselves are paid at a level on which they cannot sustain 
their livelihoods, and where responsibility for service delivery has been partially 
‘outsourced’ to external partners. It is easier for donors to take up such a role than to 
withdraw from it, and some donor officials lamented the need for them to be continuously 
‘bailing out’ government. 
Under these conditions, even when unconvinced of their change potential, government 
would tend still to accept CDS interventions for the project-benefits these come with, which 
help civil servants make ends meet. Without detracting from the strong advances in the 
capacity of both governments, this study repeats earlier studies in observing that the 
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governments have developed capacity, yet at a level that is nowhere near commensurate to 
the high CDS investments made.  
At the time the study was conducted, donors mostly provided CDS bilaterally, with limited 
exchange and joint action with other CDS providers. This represents a step backwards from 
a decade ago, when trust and energy was invested by government and donors alike in 
coordinated approaches under developing-country leadership. The period when Sector-Wide 
Approaches (SWAps) were implemented with strong donor participation temporarily 
increased line-ministry leverage over CDS and led to a more coordinated process of joint 
identification of needs. Though sometimes perceived as such, SWAps do not particularly 
prescribe forms of joint financing (e.g. budget support) but instead promote transparent and 
concerted forms of government-led development cooperation. The key difference from a 
decade ago is that donors’ headquarters have lost both the appetite and political support to 
engage in coordinated approaches with less control and reduced visibility. 
More than a decade ago, both Cambodia and Malawi formally expressed the need for 
change and, with donor financial support, commissioned studies that presented a critical 
assessment of the state of play. These studies subsequently informed their overall 
development cooperation strategies that call for a need to reform current CDS practices. 
These were backed up by international declarations on aid effectiveness that called for 
similar reforms. Given this apparent clear sense of direction, the question is why these 
overall priorities have failed to become translated into practice? 
An important part of the answer is that formal objectives for reform of CDS, as expressed in 
overall development cooperation policies, are a key starting point for government’s reform 
efforts though nothing more than that. Evidence gathered in the two countries suggests that, 
despite the clear and fundamental objectives for reform of CDS, actual efforts made by 
government to operationalise and implement these have been modest and mainly limited to 
‘sensitisation’ of donors. Moreover, and exceptions notwithstanding, the government 
officials who gave shape to these overall aid policies are not the same as the officials who 
work directly with donors in elaborating concrete interventions. Line ministries on the 
receiving end of development cooperation are less directly led by government’s aid 
management policies, which are mostly championed by their ministries of finance or 
dedicated planning agencies. 
Actions committed to on the part of government in the area of CDS reform, which in both 
cases concerned the adoption of a national strategy on capacity development in relation to 
public-sector reform, have failed to take off or remained on the drawing board. The 
somewhat paradoxical result is two governments strongly intent on fundamentally changing 
CDS practices, in the case of Cambodia with specific guidelines on TC, but without an 
overall strategy on how to make use of such reoriented support in terms of relating it to their 
own capacity development objectives and efforts. 
Sectoral capacity development strategies were prepared by the line ministries responsible for 
health and education but, apart from the Cambodian education Master Plan, were not 
adopted. Relatively top-down approaches to leadership and patronage networks strongly 
influencing internal mobility in government have hindered CDS initiatives in promoting 
capacity results that transcend the individual level or the actions of individual departments. 
The dire situation in public services causes the health and education ministries to pursue 
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resource maximisation strategies that largely involve accommodating donors’ projects in 
different shapes and forms. No specific push is made for CDS to use and support 
government’s own systems, while negotiations of individual interventions mainly focus on 
detailing specific project components (as opposed to discussing whether the project is 
needed) and whom these should target. This indicates that officials in government are still 
inclined to accept support that is provided in ways that do not fully align with their systems.  
In the absence of ministry-owned CD plans, and a clear and ambiguous management push, 
most donors resort to taking a strong lead in designing CDS interventions. Whilst 
understandable as a pragmatic approach to dispatching experts and using allocated funds, 
this approach risks providing CDS to areas that government considers low priority, or to 
which it refuses to give due priority because it lacks the will for change. The latter areas 
included strong donor priorities such as merit-based pay, decentralised procurement and 
national audit functions. 
In terms of focus, CDS interventions thus concentrated mostly on the functional dimensions 
of governance in the sector and mainly pursued technical solutions to observed problems, 
lacks and deficits. Both government and donor officials suggested that the other side was 
mainly interested in such ‘technical fixes’, but this is again explained by the more systemic 
difficulties and barriers towards support targeting more political dimensions of capacity. In a 
formal sense, these could be considered ‘off-limits’ for external support, yet many cases 
were detected where advisors were made an integral and essential part of government’s own 
change-management efforts.  
Interdisciplinary research on effective cooperation highlights the importance of fairness, 
trustworthiness, communication and reputation, all of which linked to the central aspect of 
reciprocity. Beyond the challenge of giving adequate attention to these factors in the design 
of interventions, the processes of procuring or recruiting local or international advisors focus 
insufficiently on ensuring and promoting these key factors, and instead emphasise 
‘objective’ selection criteria such as technical skills, years of experience and academic 
qualifications. 
Low donor investments into evaluations of CDS interventions, as well as their tendency to 
keep such reports internal, hinder learning from past experiences and affect institutional 
memory. This risks duplicating or replicating interventions with low value or 
counterproductive effects that could otherwise have been adjusted or changed to ensure 
greater relevance and effectiveness. More fundamentally, it reflects a lack of transparency in 
the objectives and features of individual CDS interventions, which has an unintended effect 
of contributing to negative perceptions and prejudices among government officials about 
CDS and advisors in particular. 
These findings thus describe a political economy whereby all involved actors have few 
incentives to radically change the way in which CDS is managed and where, instead, 
ineffective practices are largely reproduced over time as none of the actors experience any 
direct costs or consequences for doing so, as well as no direct rewards for change. While 
some donors have introduced important reforms, government remains best-placed to 
fundamentally break through this cycle of low effectiveness. As per these overall findings, 
this study concludes that it is not formal strategies and policy frameworks but individual 
perceptions and attitudes of government officials that decisively influence the role and 
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ability of CDS to support government and develop capacity. In aid-dependent and low-
income countries such as Cambodia and Malawi, longer-term CDS interventions are more 
likely to be effective and sustainable when they promote adaptive and teamwork-oriented 
approaches under the leadership of strong and respected government officials. 
Guided by this overall conclusion, six changes to existing practices need to be made to 
promote more effective and sustainable CDS in Cambodia and Malawi: 
1 The starting point of preparing CDS interventions should be a joint diagnosis of the 
sector, in which government and all donors equally participate, as opposed to bilateral 
appraisal missions.  
2 The design of interventions needs to be driven and led by key change-makers in 
government. Donors should adapt their procurement or recruitment procedures to 
refrain from providing support unless government leads this process.  
3 Advisors with a capacity-development mandate should only report to government and 
not to donors, and ToRs should avoid fragmented or donor-oriented accountability 
relations. 
4 Co-funding of advisors by government should be required as a proxy of real 
commitment. Requiring government to contribute formally to each advisor, even if at a 
minor level, would improve conditions for reciprocity and strengthen accountability 
relations. 
5 Donors should report disaggregated budgets of CDS interventions through government’s 
own systems, and make public ToRs and evaluations of CDS interventions. Current 
practices lack transparency and encourage duplication, fragmentation and suspicion. 
6 Government should commission periodic evaluations to assess progress made in 
strengthening sector capacity, including the effectiveness of external inputs provided. 
Such evaluations would promote integrated capacity development approaches in govern-
ment. 
These recommendations provide a basis for a gradual and incremental shift towards more 
formalised and centrally planned CDS management, which government could manage 
through its own systems for public planning, procurement, implementation and reporting. If 
it is still strongly reliant on external inputs at this stage of a more centralised demand 
articulation, such efforts could be guided by a government-wide capacity-development 
strategy that includes, but does not revolve around, objectives and principles for external 
support. The drafting and implementation of such a strategy should be led by the 
government ministry responsible for the public service. 
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Annex 1: Operationalisation of research questions 
 Method 1:  
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
Method 2: 
Document 
research 
(published  
or grey) 
Method 3:  
Relevant official 
indices and websites  
(e.g. aid management 
platforms) 
RQ 1: How can the country government’s approach to managing external cooperation be described, 
in terms of their formal policies and/or concrete actions towards promoting aid and development 
effectiveness in general? To what extent is the approach as observed centralised and homogenous in 
nature, or decentralised and sector-specific? 
1.1: What are the main objectives of the 
country’s overall policy on managing external 
cooperation? 
 X  
1.2: In addition to adopting these policies, what 
evidence is available of concrete government 
action towards pursuing the goals outlined in 
this policy? 
X X  
1.3: To what extent are the approaches taken at 
the line-ministry level to promote aid and 
development effectiveness consistent with 
overall government policy? 
X X  
RQ 2: At what level and how does government articulate or otherwise promote specific priorities in 
relation to capacity development (e.g. on the ‘what’ of this support in relation to desired institutional 
change), and how does it engage with parliament, non-state actors and other relevant stakeholders in 
determining these? 
2.1: What are the main priorities in relation to 
external capacity development support, as 
defined at central and/or line-ministry level? 
X X  
2.2: Is there evidence of governmental direct 
engagement with non-state actors, parliaments 
and/or donors in relation to the formulation and 
promotion of such priorities? 
X   
2.3: To what extent does available research 
evidence and perceptions of effectiveness 
indicate that government’s approach has 
enabled it to benefit from CDS? 
X X  
RQ 3: To what extent does government have an overview of total CDS provided to the country by 
different providers? 
3.1: Does the government have an online platform 
to capture information about external cooperation, 
and do stakeholders consider this system to be 
functional and complete in relation to CDS? 
X X X 
3.2: Do all external partners supply information 
to government on CDS?  X X X 
3.3: What written evidence is available to show 
how government’s data is being used by other 
stakeholders, and how does government indicate 
to use data on CDS?  
X X  
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 Method 1:  
Semi-
structured 
interviews 
Method 2: 
Document 
research 
(published  
or grey) 
Method 3:  
Relevant official 
indices and websites  
(e.g. aid management 
platforms) 
RQ 4: To what extent are government’s own systems used in planning, designing, contracting or 
procuring, implementing and evaluating the CDS provided by different stakeholders? To what extent 
and how does government promote the use of its systems? 
4.1: To what degree and in what way have 
country systems been used by donors since the 
adoption of the Paris Declaration, and to what 
extent are there strong differences between 
donors? 
 X  
4.2: How do key indices (CPIA, PEFA, …) 
judge the quality of country systems?   X 
4.3: What analytical efforts have government 
and donors made to examine options and 
feasibility of the use of country systems, and to 
what extent has it been a key issue for dialogue? 
X X  
4.4: To what extent does government 
specifically push for the use of its systems, 
either at the central or line-ministry level (as 
expressed in strategies, organisation of 
workshops, or specific actions)? 
X X  
4.5: What evidence and effectiveness 
perceptions are available of the involvement of 
government in design, planning, implementing 
and evaluation of specific CDS interventions? 
X X  
RQ 5: Linked to this overview of support, how can accountability relations concerning CDS be 
described in terms of (a) of the sharing of information on CDS interventions between stakeholders, (b) 
dedicated processes to learn from past CDS interventions by those directly involved and (c) sharing 
lessons learned from past support with other relevant stakeholders? 
5.1: To what extent do donors coordinate their 
CDS efforts, either ex-ante (seeking cooperation 
possibilities, sharing information) or ex-post 
(sharing ToRs once the decision to provide 
support has been taken)? 
X   
5.2: To what extent is CDS evaluated by the 
donor and/or partners, and to what extent is this 
evaluation shared with other donors and/or 
government, or made public? 
X   
RQ 6: What lessons can be drawn from the findings in relation to the assumed symbiotic relation 
between developing-country efforts to strengthening institutions and joint efforts to strengthen the 
effectiveness of CDS, and what possible implications can be identified for the engagement of the EIP? 
6.1: To what extent is there evidence to suggest 
that institutional change in the country has led 
to a more effective approach to managing CDS, 
and vice versa? 
X X  
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